Viewing Unconscionability through a Market Lens by Gilo, David & Porat, Ariel
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2009
Viewing Unconscionability through a Market Lens
David Gilo
Ariel Porat
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Gilo & Ariel Porat, "Viewing Unconscionability through a Market Lens" ( John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 489, 2009).
 CHICAGO  
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 489 
(2D SERIES) 
 
 
 
Viewing Unconscionability through a 
Market Lens 
 
David Gilo and Ariel Porat 
 
 
 
THE  LAW  SCHOOL  
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  
 
October 2009 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection. 
VIEWING UNCONSCIONABILITY 
THROUGH A MARKET LENS 
 
 
David Gilo and Ariel Porat* 
 
This Article calls for a move to the third phase in courts' attitudes toward 
consumer contracts. In the first phase, consumer contracts were 
considered ordinary contracts by courts thus requiring no special 
treatment. In the second phase, courts and legislatures became suspicious 
of consumer contracts and developed several tools for handling them, 
focusing on the characteristics of the parties and the transaction. In this 
Article, we suggest that it is time to introduce a third phase: Rather than 
examining each consumer contract in isolation, courts need to 
acknowledge that consumer contracts are a market-phenomenon which 
calls for a market-based approach. Instead of focusing on the 
characteristics of the parties and the transaction, courts should inquire 
whether there is competition, or potential competition, over contracts in 
the supplier’s market. In order to do so, courts should look at the 
particular features of the supplier’s market, that we identify, and also on 
the potential strategic interaction among competitors. We argue that when 
competition over contracts, or the threat of such competition, is 
sufficiently strong, consumer contracts should be deemed efficient and 
fair, and courts should not strike down clauses incorporated in such 
contracts. Interestingly, and counter-intuitively, this conclusion holds even 
where consumers are uninformed. We offer workable guidelines for courts 
as to how they could implement the market-based approach proposed in 
this Article and show how this approach could produce outcomes opposite 
to, but more efficient and fair, than the ones conventionally adopted by 
courts or offered by legal scholars. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Suppose you buy a computer from a manufacturer of electronic equipment, and after 
a few days of use the computer breaks down. Even though you had purchased a warranty 
from the seller you find out that it does not cover your losses. The reason is that a clause 
in the fine print limits recovery to losses caused by some components of the computer but 
not by others. The question of whether to strike down such a clause is generally 
determined by courts according to a combination of three considerations, mostly under 
the doctrine of unconscionability:1 first, the information gap between the supplier and his 
consumers, which exists when consumers are not aware of the full value loss the clause 
entails;2 second, whether the supplier enjoys superior bargaining power;3 third, the degree 
of harshness, or one-sidedness, of the clause.4  
Law and economics scholars have argued that only the consideration regarding the 
information gap should matter. The reason is that even if a supplier possessed superior 
bargaining power, it would not incorporate an inefficient clause into its standard form 
contract if consumers were aware of the clause and its full cost to them; the supplier 
would always prefer to have an efficient contract. To the extent that the supplier had 
superior bargaining power it would use it to raise the price rather than to impose an 
inefficient clause.5 It is only when consumers are unaware of the clause or of the full cost 
it is imposing upon them that the supplier can extract value from consumers by 
incorporating inefficient terms into its standard form contracts.6 Therefore, the law and 
economics literature concludes that intervention is justified if, and only if, consumers 
lack sufficient information.7 
Surprisingly, however, the question of how courts should verify whether consumers 
are informed remained under-explored in legal writings. As a result, courts conduct a 
transaction-specific analysis as to whether there is a gap of information between the 
supplier in question and his consumers and reach decisions accordingly. Determining 
whether consumers are sufficiently informed in a particular case, or in a particular 
market, however, is an extremely formidable task for courts. 
                                                 
1 Infra Section III.A.  
2 Infra note 99 and accompanying text.  
3 Infra note 99 and accompanying text.  
4 Infra note 101 and accompanying text.  
5 Infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
6 Infra note 15 and accompanying text.  
7 As shown by Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979), if there are enough 
sophisticated consumers who shop and compare the terms of suppliers’ deals, suppliers will be  motivated 
to offer efficient contracts. See also Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit? 37 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2008) (showing that when the number of informed consumers is sufficiently large, 
suppliers would refrain from including inefficient terms in their contracts). It remains to be asked what a 
court should do when it is claimed that a large portion of consumers is uninformed. Our article provides a 
tool to deal with such cases. 
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This Article offers a new method for courts to consider  whether to strike down an 
oppressive term. The Article's claim is that instead of trying to explore directly whether 
there is a gap of information between the supplier and his consumers, courts should 
inquire whether market forces have the potential to close this gap. In particular, we 
develop tools according to which courts should determine whether the supplier’s market 
encourages competing suppliers, or other  parties, to draw consumers' attention to 
inefficient or unfair terms in the supplier’s contract.8 If the answer is "yes" the contract 
should be deemed efficient and fair and courts should not intervene against it; if the 
answer is "no", courts should be suspicious of oppressive terms in the contract and apply 
the transaction-specific analysis they currently apply to such contracts. Thus, in the 
computer example mentioned above, it is very difficult for a court to determine whether 
the buyer of the computer, or many of the supplier’s consumers, are sufficiently 
informed. Nevertheless, we claim that courts should not intervene if they are convinced 
that the computer supplier’s market encourages its competitors, or other parties, to expose 
to consumers inefficient or unfair exclusionary clauses in the supplier’s contracts.  
The virtue of our proposed market-based method is not only that it circumvents the 
prohibitive costs of inquiring whether consumers are informed. It also helps identify 
cases where consumers are known or presumed to be uninformed but where nevertheless 
court intervention is unwarranted. In particular, if consumers are uninformed, as long as 
there is a credible threat that competitors or other parties allude consumers' attention to 
suppliers’ inefficient or unfair terms, no supplier would incorporate such terms in its 
contract in the first place. Thus, in equilibrium, when the threat of competition over 
contracts is credible, contracts should be deemed efficient and fair and any court 
intervention is unwarranted. To illustrate, in the computer example above, courts should 
not strike down the exclusionary clause if they are convinced that in the relevant 
computer market, had the clause been inefficient or unfair, competitors or other parties 
would have criticized it, and the supplier would have lost market share.9  
                                                 
8 In our terminology, fairness in a contract exists when the bargain is consistent with both parties' 
reasonable expectations. According to this terminology, any fair contract is also efficient, since, when both 
parties to a contract are informed, the contract is not only fair, but also efficient. Not every efficient 
contract is necessarily fair, however. For example, if the contract allocates risks efficiently, and the 
consumer values the product more than the product’s marginal cost, the contract is efficient. The same 
contract, however, could still be unfair if the supplier reaps most of the contract’s surplus by using 
deceptive techniques, thereby frustrating the consumer’s reasonable expectations. See, e.g., W. David 
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 
531 (1971) ("An unfair form will not deter sales because the seller can easily arrange his sales so that few if 
any buyers will read his forms, whatever their terms ...").  
9 Previous authors have mentioned, in specific contexts, that competition among suppliers could educate 
consumers about inefficient terms in consumer contracts. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, My Way and the 
Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. 
L. REV. 700, 716 (1992) (stating, in the context of choice of forum clauses in consumer contracts, that if a 
firm uses inefficient terms with a low price, a rival firm offering efficient terms with a higher price would 
want to highlight this fact); Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market 
Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 111 (2006) (arguing that when consumers overvalue a product, a 
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As we show, the effectiveness of competition over contracts in deterring suppliers 
from using inefficient or unfair standard form contracts crucially depends on the nature of 
the oppressive techniques used by suppliers. We distinguish between four oppressive 
techniques, only the first one has been attracting courts' scrutiny and attention, while the 
other three have been, for the most part, ignored by courts, even though they are very 
common and could be very harmful. The first and most familiar technique is to 
incorporate terms into the contract which deprive the consumer of a right or a remedy to 
which she would have been entitled but for the oppressive terms (hereinafter: "traditional 
oppressive term" or "TOT"). Clauses limiting the supplier’s liability such as the one 
described in the above-mentioned computer example are illustrative of such terms. The 
second technique is to incorporate terms into the contract which are oppressive only for 
some consumers but not for others. Typically, those who are not offended by the terms 
are consumers who were aware of their existence, and made some effort to avoid their 
adverse effects (hereinafter: "selectively oppressive term" or "SOT"). An example of a 
SOT is a term that deprives consumers of a remedy, but allows consumers who carefully 
read the contract to relieve themselves of the oppressive term.10 The third technique is to 
incorporate contract terms which confer benefits on some consumers but not on others 
(hereinafter: "selectively beneficial term" or "SBT"). As in the case of a SOT, with an 
SBT only those consumers who make some effort to attain the benefits will receive them. 
A typical example is a term, included in the fine print, allowing a discount only for a 
consumer who is aware of the term and is willing to fill out a certain form to receive the 
discount.11 The fourth and last oppressive technique that we identify is artificial 
complication of contracts. Under this technique, by making contracts more complex, 
suppliers can extract benefits from consumers.12  
                                                                                                                                                 
seller of a better product is expected to draw away such consumers by trumpeting their mistake); David 
Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of 
Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 1009, 
at note 64 (2006) (mentioning that “the saliency of terms is, for the most part, endogenous: a supplier could 
snatch business from his rival by highlighting the rival’s harsh nonsalient terms.”); Xavier Gabaix & David 
Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 
121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 506 (2006) (identifying that when suppliers try to exploit consumers’ mistakes, 
competing suppliers may wish to expose such exploitation). But see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 
Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements 5 J. 
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 468 (2008) (finding no statistically significant relationship between the 
degree of competition in software markets and the incidence of pro-supplier fine print.) To the best of our 
knowledge, however, ours is the first article to formulate this basic notion into a systematic methodology 
courts should pursue when assessing consumer contracts. 
10 For example, a contract which states that the supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to 
90 days, unless the consumer asks otherwise at the time of purchase and fills out the requisite forms. For 
further discussion, see infra Section I.B.1. 
11 For further discussion see infra Section I.C.1. 
12 For example, a supplier of services, who provides several different plans, in a way that makes it 
difficult for a consumer to evaluate which plan best suits him. For further discussion, see infra Section 
I.D.1. See Gilo and Porat, supra note 9, at 1004-1005 (showing how suppliers can use complexity of their 
consumer contracts in order to stifle competition); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of 
Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1073, 1102-6 (2009) (showing how complex 
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The Article demonstrates how among the four oppressive techniques, only the 
traditional one, the TOT, is sufficiently affected by competition over contracts. We show 
how such competition cannot deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair SOTs, SBTs 
or artificial complexity. Courts should therefore be particularly suspicious of SOTs, SBTs 
and artificial complexity, and analyze them on a case by case basis, disregarding the 
degree of competition over contracts in the market.  
TOTs, however, should be assessed differently. Since inefficient or unfair TOTs 
could be effectively eliminated by competition over contracts, they should be analyzed 
according to the market-based method we develop here. Rather than analyzing TOTs on 
the basis of the parties to the contract and their characteristics, as courts currently do, 
according to this Article's proposal courts should explore the structure of the supplier’s 
market and the nature and capabilities of the supplier’s rivals. Furthermore, the Article 
lists four factors that could hinder the ability of competition to expose TOTs. When these 
factors are particularly strong, competition over contracts cannot be counted upon and 
courts should scrutinize consumer contracts according to the transaction-specific analysis 
they currently apply. The four factors are:  
(1) Backfiring: sometimes suppliers might avoid criticizing their rivals' TOT so as to 
avoid a negative backfiring effect on themselves. There are three types of backfiring: 
Consumers’ backfiring on the product occurs when criticizing a rival’s oppressive 
technique could expose weaknesses in the criticizer’s own product or service;13 
Consumers’ backfiring on the contract occurs when exposing a rival’s TOT requires the 
criticizing supplier to stop using similar TOTs himself; rivals’ backfiring occurs when the 
criticized supplier is driven to retaliate. 
(2) Attracting Unwanted Consumers: At times when a supplier exposes TOTs in his 
rivals' contracts he ends up “gaining” unwanted, high-cost consumers.14 This could be a 
reason not to engage in such an exposition in the first place.  
(3) Benefit Externalization: A supplier might avoid criticizing his competitors' TOTs 
because the benefits of such efforts would be shared by other rival suppliers, while the 
criticizing supplier would shoulder the entire cost.15  
                                                                                                                                                 
sub-prime mortgage contracts are and explaining accordingly that competition could not solve 
inefficiencies in such contracts).  
13 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market 
Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 339 (2000) (arguing that firms may not want to 
advertise the safety of their product because this raises consumers’ awareness to the risk in all such 
products and reduces their demand); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The 
Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1680-81 (2006) (arguing that a firm 
may not want to highlight that it does not bind arbitration in a distant forum so as not to draw consumers’ 
attention to the probability of disputes).  
14 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1242-43 (2003) (arguing that a firm would not want to brag about its lack of an 
arbitration clause because this might attract consumers liable to sue the firm). 
15 See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 
527 (1981) (claiming that firms may not have suitable incentives to disclose to consumers positive 
information about their product when rivals selling the same product would share the benefits from such 
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(4) Irresponsive consumers: In certain situations many consumers would not change their 
consumption decisions even if competition exposing the TOT were to take place. In such 
cases highlighting a rival supplier’s TOT could be unrewarding.16 
 
    This Article offers to courts a coherent and systematic method for assessing TOTs 
based on these insights. For example, it shows how, contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
a TOT is more likely to be efficient and fair in a (competitive) market in which most 
suppliers adopt it. It also shows how a (competitive) market for a product or service that 
is essential to consumers justifies less intervention against TOTs than a market in which 
the product or service is non-essential. Also, in many instances, TOTs that qualify a right 
granted by the supplier himself should be treated more leniently than TOTs that qualify a 
default rule imposed by law. Accordingly, the Article offers courts workable guidelines 
according to which they can shape their intervention policies against consumers' 
contracts. 
The Article also demonstrates how competition over contracts takes place in the real 
world. It provides numerous examples of suppliers’ campaigns criticizing their rivals' 
contracts.17 The incidence of such campaigns actually understates the true impact of 
competition over contracts for two reasons. First, it is expected that many suppliers 
engage in covert efforts to criticize their rivals, e.g., through their sales representatives. 
Second, in a market in which a credible threat of competition over contracts exists, TOTs 
are expected to be efficient and fair even where no such competition is actually observed: 
In such markets, suppliers would be deterred from employing inefficient or unfair TOTs. 
The Article is organized as follows: In Part I we describe the four oppressive 
techniques, discuss the motivations for suppliers to use them, and also expose their 
potential welfare-reducing and welfare-enhancing effects. In this part, we shall ignore the 
corrective potential of competition over contracts. Part II considers how competition 
affects the efficiency and fairness of each of the four oppressive techniques identified in 
Part I. As we show, intense competition over contracts could expose inefficient and 
unfair TOTs, but not SOTs, SBTs and Complexity. As a result, we propose that SOTs, 
SBTs and artificial complexity, which are not subject to market discipline, be analyzed 
according to strict case by case scrutiny. In this part we also analyze the factors that could 
prevent competition over contracts from guaranteeing efficient TOTs. Part III draws 
workable guidelines from the results obtained in Parts I and II as to how courts could 
employ the market-based methodology to TOTs. Conclusions follow.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
disclosure); Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority 
to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 659 (1996) (same). 
16 See Korobkin, supra note 14 (claiming that highlighting the existence of a forum selection clause is 
not likely to change consumers’ purchase decisions). 
17 See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. 
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I. OPPRESSIVE TECHNIQUES 
 
In this Part we present four oppressive techniques used by suppliers in their contracts 
with consumers. Only the first one was discussed in court decisions. With regard to each 
technique we expose suppliers’ motivations for employing it and evaluate it from a social 
perspective. The effects of competition on each technique are ignored at this stage.  
 
A. Traditional Oppressive Terms 
1. The Technique 
 
Many standard form contracts contain terms which deprive consumers of rights or 
remedies to which they would be entitled but for these terms. We call such terms 
"Traditional Oppressive Terms" (or "TOTs"). Example 1 illustrates a TOT. 
 
Example 1. TV Set. In a contract for the provision of a TV set, the time of delivery is set 
for January 1, 2009. In the boilerplate, however, there is a clause stating that "the 
supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to 90 days."18  
 
While in Example 1 the TOT exempts the supplier from contractual liability, in the 
next example, the TOT caps tort damages.  
 
Example 2. The Dry Cleaner. A Dry Cleaner offers its consumers a standard form 
contract which contains a term stating that "the Dry Cleaner’s liability per item is 
limited to 15 times the fee paid for the damaged or lost item."19 
2. Suppliers' Possible Motivations  
 
In order to understand why suppliers use TOTs one should distinguish between two 
states of the world: one, where there is no gap of information between the suppliers and 
the consumers; the other, where there is such a gap. Absent an information gap between 
the supplier and his consumers, there is a solid basis for assuming that the supplier 
incorporated the TOT into the contract in order to increase the value of the contract to 
                                                 
18 See Corinno Civetta Constr. Corp. v. New York, 67 N.Y.2d 297, 306 (1986) (stating that "damages 
resulting from uncontemplated delays caused by the contractee may be recovered despite the existence of a 
broad exculpatory clause relieving the contractee from liability"); In Fowler, Rodriguez, Kingsmill, Flint, 
Gray & Chalos, LLP v. Island Properties, LLC, 833 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (2007) the Court ruled that 
"[G]enerally, even with such a [broad exculpatory] clause, damages may be recovered for: (1) delays 
caused by the contractee's bad faith or its willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, (2) 
uncontemplated delays, (3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the 
contract by the contractee, and (4) delays resulting from the contractee's breach of a fundamental obligation 
of the contract." 
19 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 119-120 (1993) (saying that 
standard form contracts are common in markets which are highly competitive, dry cleaning being a typical 
example). 
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himself as well as to consumers. The explanation is that when both parties to a contract 
possess all relevant information, they strive to incorporate efficient terms into their 
contract, which increase their mutual benefit.20 This reasoning applies even when one of 
the parties (the supplier) enjoys superior bargaining power vis a vis the other party (the 
consumer).21 In contrast, when consumers are not fully aware of the loss of value the 
TOT imposes upon them, there is a risk that the supplier will incorporate a TOT into his 
standard form contracts so as to extract value from consumers, without the latter being 
aware of it, and even induce some consumers to buy a product they would not have 
bought had they been aware of its true cost to them.22  
It is often hard to know by just looking at a TOT whether it is welfare-reducing, or 
rather welfare-enhancing. To illustrate, let's return to Example 2 (The Dry Cleaner). At 
first glance the TOT in this example seems welfare-reducing: the Dry Cleaner, rather than 
the consumer, is in a position to take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to 
consumers’ clothes. If the Dry Cleaner bears the harm in its entirety, it will take efficient 
precautions to prevent such harm. With the TOT, the supplier’s liability for damaged 
clothes is capped, so that he lacks appropriate incentives to take care. But 
notwithstanding first appearances, the following subtle point should be considered. 
Suppose everyone pays the same fee per item of laundry regardless of its value. With no 
cap on damages owed by the Dry Cleaner, consumers owning cheap items would find 
themselves subsidizing owners of expensive items. In the long run, many owners of 
cheap items would drop out, prices would go up, and eventually the entire service might 
                                                 
20 For the case without an information gap see Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form 
Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1990) ("In a free market, 
exchanges among knowledgeable rational people are expected to result in Pareto superior results…"); 
Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller 
Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 363 (1991) (mentioning that sellers have incentives to select an 
efficient rule on their own). For the case with an information gap see Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law 
& Economics 208 (5th ed. 2008) ("the presence of asymmetric information can sometimes preclude 
otherwise mutually beneficial exchanges from taking place."); Handbook of Law and Economics Vol. 1 34 
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (hereinafter: Handbook of Law and Economics Vol. 1) 
("asymmetric information between the parties at the time a contract is negotiated can lead to distortions in 
the resulting contract vis-à-vis the contract that would have been negotiated under symmetric 
information.").  
21 See A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. OF ECON. 417–29 (1975) 
(showing that a monopolist prefers to offer quality preferred by the “marginal consumer” – the first 
consumer to leave the supplier when price goes up -- and elect price so as to maximize its profits); Douglas 
G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 941 (2006) (explaining that even a monopolist 
looks for efficient warranty terms). 
22 See Korobkin, supra note 14, at 1217-8 (“Efficiency requires not only that buyers be aware of the 
content of form contracts, but also that they fully incorporate that information into their purchase decisions. 
Because buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully rational decisionmakers, they will infrequently 
satisfy this requirement. … ”); Steven P. Croley & D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case 
for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 770 (1993) (arguing that without full information 
consumers are unable to make consumption and warranty decisions that reflect their true preferences); 
Meyerson, supra note 13, at 585 (same). 
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disappear from the market.23 This concern—which a cap on damages mitigates—is the 
result of a gap of information between suppliers and consumers, but in a direction 
opposite to the one discussed so far. Here it is the suppliers rather than consumers who 
lack sufficient information. Suppliers are often ignorant as to whether the consumer with 
whom they transact is a high risk (expensive clothes) or low risk (inexpensive clothes) 
type. Had the supplier been able to distinguish between high and low risk consumers, the 
supplier would have charged each consumer in Example 2 a fee reflecting the value of his 
or her item, and a cap on damages would not have been necessary. However, given the 
above-mentioned gap of information, the supplier must charge all consumers a uniform 
price and a limitation on damages will be necessary for facilitating the provision of the 
service to consumers of all types.24 
An important lesson to be learned from the example above is that it is difficult for 
courts to judge a TOT merely according to its perceived “harshness” or “one-sidedness”. 
Thus it is all the more important to provide courts with manageable tools for determining 
whether a supplier would want to include a welfare-reducing TOT in his contracts, 
without having to assess the TOT’s merits directly. As shown in part II, the market-based 
method we propose constitutes such a tool. Before presenting our market-based approach 
to TOTs, however, the next section describes the welfare concerns stemming from TOTs. 
3. Welfare Concerns 
 
As demonstrated above, absent information gaps in which consumers lack sufficient 
information, all terms in standard form contracts should be deemed welfare enhancing 
and therefore efficient. There is no need to particularly explore whether a term is 
efficient, because, regardless of his bargaining position, the supplier only loses from 
including inefficient terms in his contract. As demonstrated, this could be so even with 
terms that, at first blush, seem inefficient. Also, no particular fairness concern emerges 
when there is no gap of information between the parties, because the consumer got 
exactly what he expected, or reasonably could expect, to get.  
If, however, consumers are not informed enough as to the oppressive term or its cost 
to them, three kinds of efficiency concerns arise. First, suppliers may incorporate terms 
into the contract that allocate risks between the parties inefficiently (“inefficient 
allocation of risks”). For example,  the TV supplier of Example 1 might include the TOT 
relieving him from liability for late delivery even when it saves him less than the cost it 
imposes on the consumer. Second, regardless of whether the term involves inefficient 
                                                 
23 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 110-111 (7th ed., 2007) (Describing a similar 
phenomenon in the case of insurance); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential 
Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 105, 137-8 (1989) (justifying reducing damages in order 
to prevent the cross-subsidization of some plaintiffs by others).  
24 See also Baird, supra note 21, at 940 (arguing that a disclaimer of liability for consequential damages 
could be motivated by the supplier's goal of avoiding liability for harms caused by the carelessness of 
others).  
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allocation of risks, a second form of inefficiency may evolve: many uninformed 
consumers might buy products and services they should not have bought (“inefficient 
contracting”). For example, regardless of the TOT's efficiency, some consumers who 
bought the TV would not have bought it had they been aware of the TOT. Third, and, 
again, regardless of whether the TOT allocates risks efficiently, informed consumers 
might refrain from buying the product due to the TOT (“inefficient non-contracting”).25 
In example 1, the TOT imposes a cost on consumers (due to late delivery) yet this is not 
reflected in the TV’s price. A consumer who understands this may well refrain from 
buying the TV, although it would have been socially warranted for him to buy it for its 
fair price. 
The normative concerns with TOTs are not limited to inefficiencies. TOTs also raise 
fairness concerns, since they enable suppliers to extract value from consumers without 
them being aware of it, and induce consumers to buy products and services they do not 
really want. As such, TOTs constitute a form of deception.  
Accordingly, when consumers are not well-enough informed, both inefficiency and 
unfairness could result. It is here, however, that two crucial questions arise: First, how 
can we know whether consumers are well-enough informed? Second, what happens if 
consumers are not well-enough informed – should it then be presumed that the TOT 
creates inefficient allocation of risks, inefficient contracting, inefficient non-contracting 
or unfairness? As we will see in the next parts of the Article, a useful way to answer these 
two important questions is to explore the degree and type of competition over contracts in 
the supplier’s market. 
B. Selectively Oppressive Terms  
1. The Technique 
 
As opposed to TOTs, Selectively Oppressive Terms ("SOTs") are oppressive only 
for some consumers. Consider the following variation of Example 1. 
 
Example 3. TV Set II. In a contract for the provision of a TV set, the time of delivery is 
set for January 1, 2009. In the boilerplate, however, there is a clause stating that "the 
supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to 90 days, unless the consumer 
asks otherwise at the time of purchase and fills out the requisite forms." Filling out the 
requisite forms takes no more than a couple of minutes and entails no benefit to the 
supplier. 
  
As opposed to Example 1, in Example 3 any consumer who carefully reads the 
standard form contract will understand that she can request the removal of the 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 65, 72-74 (1983) ("[The] misallocation of 
resources results in diminished satisfaction of society's wants, and thus, in terms of what society values, a 
reduction of society's total wealth."). 
12 CONSCIONABILITY THROUGH A MARKET LENS 
 
exclusionary clause at no additional costs to her. The only reason for not doing so would 
be if the consumer were not aware of the exclusionary clause and her easy way out of it. 
Thus, with the type of SOT illustrated in Example 3, there is always an information gap 
between the supplier and some of his consumers. Only consumers who bear the 
transaction costs involved in a careful reading of the fine print will learn of the SOT and 
take costless steps to avoid it.26 
An example of a SOT is a term in a contract for the sale of a product, according to 
which the product’s warranty is conditioned upon the buyer keeping the original 
receipt.27 Only buyers who read the contract and remember to retain the receipt enjoy the 
warranty, other buyers forfeit it.28 Another example of a SOT is a term in a travel 
insurance policy in which coverage of losses due to theft is conditioned upon reporting 
the theft to the police within 24 hours.29 Insureds who either do not read the terms of the 
policy carefully or fail to comply with this specific term for other reasons, are denied 
compensation, while those who bear the transaction costs of reading the term and 
complying with it get fully compensated.30 A third example concerns granting benefits to 
consumers, but limiting, in the fine print, eligibility for the benefit to a short period of 
time. Many consumers assume they will receive the benefit, while in fact this is so only if 
they act promptly.31 A fourth and final example is a term in a car rental contract which 
                                                 
26 Not every SOT is characterized by consumers not being aware that there is a way out of the 
oppressive term. To illustrate, suppose that in Example 3, filling out the requisite forms does not take just a 
couple of minutes as in the original example, but rather is time consuming. With such a SOT, even if all 
consumers are aware of its existence, some of them will give up on filling out the forms so as to save time, 
knowing they will then have to bear the costs of the exclusionary clause. Interestingly, in this variation of 
Example 3 there is no information gap between any consumer and the supplier. Nevertheless the oppressive 
term is selective: some consumers are willing to fill out the forms and relieve themselves of the oppressive 
clause, and some are not willing to do so and thus remain subject to this clause. 
27 See, e.g., Sagemax’s insurance contract for LCD televisions, instructing that the receipt is "an integral 
part" of the contract, and the consumer "may be required to reference it to obtain service.", 
www.bhphotovideo.com/find/sagemaxTC.jsp.  
28 Arguably, asking for the original receipt could be motivated by the supplier's desire to save 
verification costs as to the validity of the warranty. It seems, however, that other means of verification – 
certainly in the computer age – could be at least as effective and almost costless. 
29 See, e.g., Access America – Travel Insurance & Assistance, Individual Travel Insurance Policy No. 
52.201NY 13-14,  
http://www.worldnomads.com/policy_wording.aspx?uid=7d4701fdcb8f487dbef849f8673502f1 (offering 
coverage for baggage, which states that "[y]ou must notify the appropriate local authorities at the place of 
the loss occurred and inform them of the value and description of your property within 24 hours after the 
loss."). 
30 Here too an argument can be made that reporting to the police immediately serves the insurer's 
interests in reducing risks. But it is quite obvious that for many types of thefts, in many countries, reporting 
to the police is almost useless, and in any case, the penalty for failing to report within 24 hours—
deprivation of entitlement to any compensation, is allegedly draconian.  
31 For example, American Airlines offers a "Low Fare Promise," according to which if the consumer 
provides a lower rate on another airline she receives a $50 coupon from American Airlines. In order to 
receive such a benefit, among other conditions, the claim must be submitted by midnight on the same day 
of the purchase from American Airlines. See http://www.studentscrooge.com/2008/10/09/the-american-
airlines-low-fare-guarantee/ (a students’ blog describing the fine print behind American Airlines’ low-fare-
guarantee). 
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penalizes the consumer for not picking up the car she has reserved, but then includes in 
the fine print a process for partly waiving the penalty.32 Only consumers who are well-
aware of this particular term and who are willing to bear the transaction costs involved in 
getting the partial waiver will receive it, many others will not.33  
2. Suppliers' Possible Motivations  
 
Suppliers may want to use SOTs for several reasons. To begin with, SOTs involve 
benefits for the supplier that resemble those derived from using TOTs: SOTs allow 
suppliers to extract value from uninformed consumers. Notwithstanding this similarity 
between TOTs and SOTs, a very important distinction between them should be made: 
With a TOT, the supplier takes the risk of losing informed consumers who find the TOT 
in the fine print and consequently decide not to buy the product. With a SOT, the supplier 
can enjoy both worlds: he manages to deceive consumers vulnerable to deception while 
retaining consumers who cannot be fooled – informed consumers can buy from the 
supplier while escaping the oppressive term.34  
Accordingly, SOTs allow suppliers to benefit informed consumers at the expense of 
uninformed consumers, thereby discriminating in favor of the former. Such a strategy 
could induce informed consumers to buy the supplier’s product or service even when 
they would not have bought it otherwise.  
Let us illustrate in more detail how SOTs allow suppliers to improve the deal they 
offer informed consumers at the expense of the uninformed consumers. Suppose the price 
of a supplier’s TV sets when all consumers are fully informed (i.e., without hiding a SOT 
in the contract) is 10. A supplier who chooses to incorporate the SOT of Example 3 into 
his contracts could exploit uninformed consumers in the following way: he could charge 
all consumers a price of 9, but extract a value of 2 from uninformed consumers through 
the SOT. In such a scenario, uninformed consumers would be subject to the oppressive 
                                                 
32 Hertz car rental agency, for example, partly refunds the prepayment in case of "No Show", but only "if 
you write to us within 90 days of the Pick Up Date at Hertz Prepaid Accounting Department….", 
http://www.hertz.com.ro/qualifications.php?topic=Amendments,+Cancellation,+No+Show+-+Lost+Rental. 
33 There could also be ex post SOTs, namely, oppressive terms which are applied in a discriminatory 
manner by suppliers: See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006) (explaining the efficiencies of many one-sided terms in 
consumer contracts, which are selectively applied). Also, “add-ons” – expensive services or products that 
are added on to the original deal, bear some resemblense to SOTs. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 9 
(analyzing the case of avoidable add-ons, such as the minibar or other servies at a hotel). As with SOTs, 
some consumers manage to avoid the add-ons, by not using them, and some end up using them. The 
difference between an avoidable add-on (such as a hotel mini bar) and a SOT is that most consumers are 
aware of the oppressive add-on before they decide whether to use it. With a SOT, on the other hand, 
uninformed consumers are simply unaware of the oppressive term hidden in the fine print, and unaware of 
the ability to avoid it. 
34 Note that some informed consumers would have entered the contract even if they hadn’t been able to 
remove the oppressive term. Supposedly, the supplier could have offered such consumers the same deal 
with a TOT and earned more. But for the supplier, it is often more important to retain the more sensitive 
informed consumers, who would not have bought the product if they were subject to the oppressive term.  
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term hidden in the fine print, relieving the supplier of liability for late delivery. Informed 
consumers, who see the SOT and fill out the forms to escape the oppressive term, pay 9 
and receive the TV on time. As a result, de facto, it is as if informed consumers pay 9, 
while uninformed consumers pay 11. The supplier saves the costs of having to deliver on 
time to uninformed consumers. These profits, made at the expense of uninformed 
consumers, can be used to enable the price reduction from 10 to 9. Accordingly, informed 
consumers, who pay 9 and receive the TV on time, are subsidized by the uninformed 
consumers. This benefits the supplier, because informed consumers are typically more 
sensitive to the terms of the deal, and many of them would not have bought the TV at the 
original price of 10. 
Why are informed consumers typically more sensitive to the terms of the deal than 
uninformed consumers? Informed consumers are those who waive the SOT and incur the 
transaction costs of reading the contract carefully, filling out the requisite forms (as in 
Example 3), and so forth. Their willingness to do so can serve as a proxy for their 
sensitivity to the terms of the deal.35  
In particular, consumers who are willing to pay attention to the fine print and escape 
the oppressive term are typically characterized as one (or more) of the following: (a) 
those who value their time less and their money more compared to others. Such 
consumers are also typically more sensitive to what they receive for their money; (b) 
large or repeat buyers, for whom investing the transaction costs involved in a careful 
reading and understanding of the contract and filling out the forms is worthwhile given 
the high volume of their business with the supplier. Such consumers too are typically 
sensitive to oppressive terms in the contract; (c) sophisticated consumers for whom the 
transaction costs are relatively low, because they are trained in reading and understanding 
such contracts and also in filling out the forms. To the extent that sophisticated 
consumers are also those better aware of alternative products, they too are often “trigger 
happy” with regard to rejecting the supplier’s product.36  
Another reason for suppliers to employ SOTs is that a contract with a SOT may look 
more fair than the same contract with a TOT. Suppliers use TOTs to extract value from 
uninformed consumers. They bear the risk, however, of courts striking the term down.37 
If suppliers use a SOT instead, as in Example 3, they benefit from both worlds: on the 
one hand many consumers would shoulder the consequences of the oppressive term 
without being aware of it, as with a TOT; but on the other hand, the term cannot be easily 
challenged in court because it appears to be fair. After all, in Example 3, a consumer 
could easily avoid the exclusionary clause if she filled out the requisite forms. The 
supplier could easily come up with an explanation justifying the requirement to fill out 
                                                 
35 Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 996-7 (discussing the imposition of transaction costs on consumers to 
distinguish between those who are more price sensitive from those who are less sensitive to price).  
36 See id. at 997. 
37 Infra Section III.A.  
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forms. The above-mentioned car rental example38 could also be explained in this way: the 
damages imposed upon the consumer for late delivery could be considered unreasonable 
by courts and struck down. However, the court may change its mind if it assumes that 
most of the penalty could "easily" be waived in favor of consumers who ask for it to be 
waived. The car rental company could come up with a reason for imposing the damages 
in the first place, and allowing a subsequent refund at a later stage.  
The innocent appearance of the contract could also protect the supplier from public 
opinion critics, as well as from his own consumers who might later realize that they 
ended up with the worst deal. Such consumers, when acknowledging they could have 
easily received the better deal, might tend to blame themselves, not the supplier.39 
A final reason suppliers might prefer to use SOTs rather than TOTs is that TOTs, as 
we shall see in Part II, could at times expose the supplier to criticism by his rivals, and 
cause the supplier to lose market share. As we show, this is not the case with a SOT. A 
rival supplier would derive little benefit from criticizing the supplier’s SOT.  
3. Welfare Concerns 
 
When consumers are not informed enough, using SOTs could be at least as 
problematic as using TOTs: in both cases the supplier extracts value from consumers, 
without the latter being aware of it. As with TOTs, SOTs too raise fairness concerns, 
could allocate risks inefficiently and might create inefficient contracting by causing 
uninformed consumers to buy a product that they don’t really want.40 
 However, as noted, and unlike TOTs, SOTs can facilitate “price discrimination” 
between informed (often more sensitive to the terms of the deal) and uninformed (often 
less sensitive to the terms of the deal) consumers. The upside of such discrimination, 
from an efficiency perspective, is that it may allow the supplier to improve the terms it 
grants to consumers who have waived the SOT and prevent them from deciding to not 
buy the product at all.41 Let us label this welfare-enhancing feature of SOTs “bringing 
consumers on board.” That is, absent the SOT, efficient transactions between the supplier 
and some informed consumers would not have taken place.42 
                                                 
38 Supra text accompanying notes 28-9. 
39 But occasionally the reverse would be true: consumers may develop antagonism toward a supplier 
who failed to make the SOT more salient.  
40 See supra section I.A.3. 
41 See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 139 (1988) (showing how price 
discrimination could improve welfare by inducing consumers who are more sensitive to price to buy the 
product).  
42 SOTs’ ability to discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers could also serve as an 
anticompetitive device that facilitates collusion among competing suppliers. The reasons for this resemble 
those of Selectively Beneficial Terms (“SBTs”), which will be discussed below See infra note 55 and 
accompanying text. 
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SOTs could also involve a distributional justice concern.43 Because SOTs enable 
price discrimination, they cause inequality among consumers: some consumers get better 
deals than others.44 However, under a SOT, consumers who enjoy the better deal are 
often the less wealthy ones: those who value their time less and their money more 
compared to others, and therefore are willing to incur the transaction costs required for 
waiving the SOTs.45 This could mitigate, or even overrule, the distributional justice 
concerns in using SOTs. 
Finally, another important difference between SOTs and TOTs relates to the higher 
sustainability of SOTs. If many consumers were informed, socially harmful TOTs would 
not survive.46 This is not the case with SOTs, since even with a mass of informed 
consumers, the supplier would not remove a socially unwarranted SOT: He would still be 
able to exploit the uninformed consumers while keeping the informed consumers 
happy.47 
In Part II, we show that competition cannot be counted upon to deter suppliers from 
using inefficient and unfair SOTs. Hence, in stark contrast to courts’ complete disregard 
of SOTs, they actually deserve strict legal scrutiny, even more so than TOTs. While, as 
shown in Part II, inefficient or unfair TOTs may be competed away under certain 
circumstances, this is shown not to be the case with SOTs. 
C. Selectively Beneficial Terms 
1. The Technique 
 
The mirror image of a SOT is a Selectively Beneficial Term ("SBT"). While SOTs 
are oppressive for only some consumers, SBTs are beneficial for only some consumers. 
Example 4 illustrates how an SBT works.  
 
                                                 
43 It is a controversial question whether the distribution of wealth should be a concern for legal rules or 
rather should be left to the tax system. See Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the 
Poor? Clarifying the Roles of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 
821 (2000) (arguing for the superiority of the tax system in this respect); TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, 
EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 14-66 (2007) (arguing that distributive justice should be a 
concern when defining tort rules). In the context of our discussion, we merely wish to point out, as a 
positive matter, that distributive effects exist, without taking sides as to whether these effects also have 
normative implications. 
44 On the other hand, one could claim that SOTs enhance distributional justice among consumers to the 
extent that they cause consumers who value the product more to pay more. Arguably, those who benefit 
more from the product should indeed pay more. 
45 Supra text accompanying notes 31-2.  
46 Supra Section I.A.1; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 7 at 673 (showing that intervention against 
contract terms is undesirable when a mass of consumers is sufficiently informed).  
47 As noted, Schwartz and Wilde, id. show that when a large enough percentage of consumers are 
informed, suppliers are induced to include efficient terms in their contract. They assume, however, that 
suppliers offer the same contractual terms to all consumers. In contrast, with a SOT, informed consumers 
are relieved from the oppressive term while uninformed consumers are not. This is why a mass of informed 
consumers would not suffice to deter the supplier from using a SOT.  
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Example 4. Special Discount. A supplier who sells computers offers, in the fine print, a 
special discount to consumers who fill out a certain form and mail it back to the 
supplier. Only consumers who read the fine print carefully and remember to fill out the 
form and mail it, enjoy the special discount. 
  
As opposed to TOTs and SOTs, which create a bad surprise for uninformed and no 
surprise for informed consumers, an SBT does not create a surprise for either informed or 
uninformed consumers. In Example 4, consumers who do not read the contract and 
therefore do not get the special discount are not misled by the supplier: they received 
exactly what they had expected! However, with SBTs consumers who bear certain 
transaction costs get better deals than others. In this respect SBTs resemble SOTs. To 
illustrate, if in the above-mentioned example the posted price for a computer is 11 and 
there is a special discount of 2 in the fine print, uninformed consumers end up paying 11, 
while informed consumers end up paying only 9.48 
There are many real life cases in which consumers who are willing to incur the 
transaction costs of reading and understanding their contracts with their suppliers receive 
greater benefits. One example is hiding a best price guarantee in the fine-print.49 Another 
example is common in subscription sales. Internet service providers often have a 
provision in the fine print granting customers signing up an option to cancel within a 
certain period of time and get their money back.50 Many consumers are not aware of this 
option, and therefore do not execute it. Probably those who are more hesitant about 
signing up would tend to incur the transaction costs of exploring all the terms of the 
contract offered to them. They are the ones who would utilize the benefit.51  
                                                 
48 As with SOTs, it is possible to distinguish between two types of SBTs: In the first type the transaction 
costs a consumer needs to incur in order to receive the benefits consist merely of the time spent in reading 
and understanding the contract. The other type of SBT is one where consumers know they are required to 
bear transaction costs—such as filling out time-consuming forms—in order to be entitled to the benefits. 
49 In this example the supplier undertakes in the fine print to match any competing offer given by 
another supplier. See Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can 
Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 528 (1997). Edlin points out that low-price guarantees 
enable price discrimination between customers who cite a competing price and other consumers. Our 
additional insight is that suppliers may want to "hide" their low-price guarantees in the fine print, rather 
than making them salient, so that only the particularly price-sensitive consumers will take advantage of the 
guarantees.  
50 See, for example, the terms of sale of Speakeasy, which offers broadband Internet services: 
"Speakeasy offers a 25-day Trial Period on all ADSL services… If you feel that you must cancel within 25 
calendar days of your Activation Date you may do so without being subject to a Disconnection Fee." 
Speakeasy, Terms of Service, http://www.speakeasy.net/tos.  
51 Cf. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form 
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Business and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857 
(2006) (arguing that suppliers often extend benefits beyond standard-form consumer-contract terms and 
explaining their motivations for doing so). 
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2. Suppliers' Possible Motivations 
 
As is evident from the examples above, the idea behind an SBTs is to confer benefits 
only on consumers who appreciate them. Hence, as with SOTs, SBTs extract more value 
from uninformed consumers while at the same time attracting informed consumers, who 
incur the transaction costs of reading the contract and, as in Example 4, filling out the 
forms. These latter consumers are typically more sensitive to the terms of the deal and 
many of them would not buy the product without the beneficial term. But there is an 
important difference between SOTs and SBTs in this respect. As noted, suppliers might 
use SOTs in order to fool uniformed consumers into buying a product under terms they 
would not have accepted had they know about them. This is not the case with SBTs, 
where even uniformed consumers buy what they aimed to buy, namely, the product 
without the special benefit. 
This also illuminates how SOTs and SBTs feature two different modes of price 
discrimination. With SBTs all consumers know how much they are paying and what they 
are receiving; by contrast, with SOTs only informed consumers have it right. This 
difference bears on the potential profits a supplier could derive from each of these two 
techniques. With an SBT, since uninformed consumers know of the high price they are 
paying (say, a posted price of 11 in Example 4) they might refrain from buying the 
supplier’s product. This is not the case with a SOT, in which uninformed consumers 
mistakenly believe they are paying a relatively low price for a contract without the 
oppressive term. Hence the supplier does not lose their business. 
Finally, as with SOTs, the supplier can use SBTs to make the contract appear fair, 
thereby immunizing it from both courts' and consumers' scrutiny. The supplier may have 
wanted to use a TOT, but is well aware that a TOT could be struck down by courts as 
unfair. To avoid this, in addition to the TOT, the supplier could incorporate an SBT into 
the contract in order to set the stage for the argument that the contract is balanced and 
fair. By using an SBT and not a beneficial term which applies to all consumers, the 
supplier gains more: only some consumers receive the benefits, while the argument that 
the contract is balanced and fair may still be accepted by courts. Thus, suppose that in 
Example 4 there was a TOT, immunizing the supplier from liability for a delay of up to 
90 days in delivery (as in Example 1). Such a TOT is at risk of invalidation by courts. 
The supplier could argue, however, that because of the TOT he offered consumers a 
special discount, in an SBT, which makes the price lower than that of his competitors. As 
explained, this strategy could protect the supplier from courts' and others’ scrutiny, even 
though most consumers, being uninformed, would pay the full price and bear the costs of 
the oppressive clause. 
19 CONSCIONABILITY THROUGH A MARKET LENS 
 
3. Welfare Concerns 
 
From a social welfare perspective, SBTs are less problematic than TOTs or SOTs. 
As noted, TOTs and SOTs present a "bad surprise"52 for uninformed consumers. This is 
not the case with SBTs, in which uninformed consumers receive what they expected to 
get. Unlike TOTs and SOTs, SBTs cannot cause consumers to buy products they do not 
really want. This implies that TOTs and SOTs possess greater potential for inefficiencies.  
The efficiency implications of an SBT depend on the social outcome of the price 
discrimination it allows, which is generally ambiguous. On the one hand, the SBT 
effectively reduces the price paid by informed consumers and this could induce such 
consumers to buy the product. That is, an SBT features the social advantage of “bringing 
consumers on board.” This effect promotes social welfare.53 On the other hand, the price 
uninformed consumers pay under an SBT is typically higher than the price consumers 
would pay absent such price discrimination. This could cause some uninformed 
consumers not to buy the product. Accordingly, SBTs also feature “inefficient non-
contracting” – they could cause efficient transactions not to take place. The latter effect 
has a negative effect on social welfare.54 Furthermore, as we show elsewhere, SBTs could 
hinder competition in certain cases, by making tacit or explicit collusion between 
competitors more likely.55  
From a fairness perspective, SBTs are much less problematic – if at all – than TOTs 
and SOTs: consumers are not deceived by suppliers, since they receive what they 
expected to get. The situation could be different where there is a special relationship 
between the supplier and the consumer. At times, a special relationship warrants the 
recognition of a duty on the part of the supplier to explicitly disclose to consumers the 
existence of an SBT in his standard form contracts.56 SBTs could also create a 
distributional justice concern, since they create inequality among consumers. Still, as 
                                                 
52 An important criterion for courts' intervention in consumer contracts is whether the arguably 
problematic terms posed a bad surprise for the consumer. See infra note 108.  
53 See TIROLE, supra note 41, at 137-142 (" … [A] necessary condition for price discrimination to be 
preferred socially is that it raise total output … ."); HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS Vol. 2 1089 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) ("price discrimination generates greater seller profits yet 
may well be benign or even favorable on average for consumers."). 
54 Supra Section I.B.3. 
55 See Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 1025-29. 
56 See, e.g. United States use of Bussen Quarries, Inc. v. Thomas, 938 F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1991) 
("The duty to disclose may arise from inequality of position, a fiduciary relationship between the parties, or 
a demonstration of superior knowledge on the part of one party that is not within the fair and reasonable 
reach of the other party."); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Little Rock, 
Ark., 774 F.2d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The duty to speak may be based on special circumstances, such 
as a confidential relationship, in which one party knows that another is relying on a misrepresentation to his 
detriment.").  
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with SOTs, in the case of SBTs consumers who enjoy better deals are often the less 
wealthy ones. This helps alleviate, or even remove, distributive justice concerns.57 
In Part II we show how competition over contracts cannot really be trusted to remove 
SBTs.  
D. Complexity 
1. The Technique 
 
The fourth and final oppressive technique often used by suppliers is artificial 
complication of the contract. The next example is illustrative.  
 
Example 5. Combined Internet and Multichannel TV Plans. An Internet provider who 
also supplies multichannel TV offers a menu of plans: each plan is different than the 
others with regard to general monthly fee, fee per special channels or group of channels, 
pay per view, video on demand services, band width, modes of payment, and all of the 
permutations among the above parameters, in ways that make it difficult for a consumer 
to evaluate the plans. 
  
There are numerous examples where there is good reason to suspect complication of 
contracts of being artificial. Contracts with cellular phone companies58, with credit card 
firms59 for mortgages,60 and for car rentals61 are common examples.  
2. Suppliers' Possible Motivations 
 
The complexity of the provider’s contracts in Example 5 creates a distinction among 
consumers similar to that of SOTs or SBTs. It is often the case that consumers who better 
understand these complexities, and hence could opt for the best deals, are the same 
consumers who delve into a supplier’s fine print to avoid SOTs or to look for SBTs. 
Other consumers, because they find the transaction costs of understanding complex 
contracts prohibitively high, might get a poorer deal. Accordingly, complexity, like SBTs 
and SOTs, can serve as a tool for price discrimination in favor of the better informed 
group of consumers.  
In addition to price discrimination, artificially complicated contracts could benefit 
the supplier in other ways. In particular, complicating contracts is sometimes necessary 
for the success of the other oppressive techniques used by suppliers. TOTs, SOTs and 
                                                 
57 Supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
58 Several websites offer comprehensive comparisons between cellular phone companies, and cellular 
plans. See, e.g., http://www.cellphones.ca/cell-plans; http://www.myrateplan.com. 
59 For a comparison between the different packages offered by various credit card firms see 
http://www.creditcards.com.  
60 See Bar-Gill, supra note 12. 
61 See Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting" for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 903 (2006) (describing the 
complexity of car rental contracts).  
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SBTs are typically hidden in the fine print and their effectiveness often depends on 
consumers’ difficulties in locating and understanding them. The degree of the contract's 
complexity affects the quantity of uninformed consumers. The level of the contract’s 
artificial complexity therefore depends on how many consumers the supplier wishes to 
keep uninformed. If the supplier wishes to exploit uninformed consumers as much as 
possible with a TOT or SOT, he will probably artificially make his contracts particularly 
complex. If he wishes to allow some consumers to enjoy a special benefit (as with an 
SBT) the artificial complexity of his contracts will probably be more moderate. 
3. Welfare Concerns 
 
Complexity used to hide a TOT or a SOT could extract value from uninformed 
consumers and also induce some of them to buy products they would not have bought but 
for the complex nature of the contract. Hence artificial complexity, in such cases, could 
feature inefficiencies (inefficient allocation of risks, inefficient contracting (by 
uninformed consumers), inefficient non-contracting (by informed consumers)), as well as 
unfairness and distributive justice concerns similar to those created by TOTs and SOTs.  
Complexity not used to hide TOTs or SOTs (i.e., complexity per se), could create 
price discrimination, the efficiency of which is ambiguous (as with SBTs the upside of 
such discrimination is bringing consumers on board but the downside is inefficient non-
contracting.) In addition, such complexity could create inefficient contracting. That is, 
complexity per se could lure consumers to enter contracts they would not have entered 
had they been informed. To illustrate, in Example 5, where uninformed consumers cannot 
really pick the package of multi-channel TV and Internet services most suitable to their 
needs, they may well find themselves with an unsuitable package which they would never 
have chosen had they understood the contract.  
Price discrimination enabled by complexity per se also raises distributive justice 
issues, but they are less of a concern to the extent that consumers discriminated against 
are the rich. Contract complexity could also stifle competition in the market, as it makes 
it harder for consumers to compare among competing suppliers.62 This makes suppliers 
less likely to try to compete for consumers.63 Note that as in the case of SOTs, socially 
                                                 
62 Indeed, Bruce Cran, president of the Consumers Association of Canada, was quoted last summer as 
saying that "They (wireless carriers) deliberately make it very difficult to make comparisons," See Gillian 
Shaw, iPhone Data Pricing Draws Fire; 35¢ for Brief email. Bell Mobility Might Feed Off Backlash, THE 
GAZETTE, July 9, 2008, at B5. In the same vein, Natalie Woodroofe, spokesman for UK credit card issuer 
Nationwide, said that: "In the current market, it is very difficult for British consumers to make an informed 
choice. There are 1,300 credit card brands available in the UK, offering a range of different rates, fees and 
complex terms and conditions." See Nina Montagu-Smith, Lay Cards on The Table, Nationwide Tells 
Rivals Building Society Wants Clarity on Fees, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Nov. 1, 2002, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/borrowing/creditcards/2832161/Lay-cards-on-the-
table-Nationwide-tells-rivals.html. 
63 See Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 997-8; Bar-Gill, supra note 12 at 1102-6.  
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harmful complexity would not disappear even if many informed consumers existed, 
because informed consumers are not particularly harmed by complexity.  
As shown in Part II, competition would often have a negligible deterrent effect 
against artificial complexity of standard form contracts. Hence this technique, like SOTs, 
should be strictly scrutinized by courts. 
 
E. Summary 
 
The following table summarizes the welfare concerns stemming from the four 
oppressive techniques. 
 
TABLE 1: WELFARE CONCERNS FROM THE OPPRESSIVE TECHNIQUES 
 
II. COMPETITION OVER CONTRACTS AND THE INFORMATION GAP 
 
In Part I, we presented four oppressive techniques used by suppliers in standard form 
contracts. We explored suppliers' possible motivations in employing these techniques and 
discussed the possible policy concerns stemming from each technique. In Part I, we 
purposely ignored the impact of competition. In the current part of the Article we 
introduce competition into the discussion. We explore to what extent competition over 
contracts can contribute to closing the gap of information between suppliers and their 
uninformed consumers. This is a crucial question because the oppressive techniques 
could not be inefficient or unfair without an information gap. Hence competition’s ability 
to close the information gap should be a central consideration in evaluating whether a 
particular oppressive technique is efficient and fair, and, accordingly, whether it warrants 
the court’s intervention in the standard form contract. 
Of course, for competition over contracts to exist, competition over price, or at least 
over quality, must be shown to exist. For example, if a supplier who uses a TOT is a 
monopolist – the only supplier in his market – his product or service faces no 
competition, so there is no competition with regard to his contract either. Competition 
could also be lacking altogether when there are only a few suppliers in the market (an 
 Inefficient Allocation of Risks 
Inefficient 
Contracting 
Inefficient Non-
Contracting 
Efficiently Bringing 
Consumers on Board Unfair  
TOT yes yes (non-
informed) 
yes (informed)  no yes 
SOT yes (non-informed) yes (non-
informed) 
no  yes yes 
SBT no no  yes (non-
informed) 
yes no 
Complex yes (non-informed) yes (non-
informed) 
yes (non-
informed) 
yes yes 
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oligopolistic market) and the market is susceptible to collusion.64 In a market prone to 
tacit or explicit collusion,  suppliers might collude also over the imposition of oppressive 
terms. In what follows, we assume that the supplier’s market is competitive enough to 
foster competition over price and quality, and we focus on the question whether and 
when competition over contracts exists. 
Competition over contracts can inform consumers who were previously 
uninformed.65 When consumers are informed, suppliers would not want to place 
inefficient terms in their fine print.66 The same is true when consumers are uninformed, 
but there is a credible threat of competition over contracts, which could inform them. 
This would suffice to deter suppliers from hiding inefficient or unfair terms in their 
standard form contracts. Hence competition over contracts, in our framework, involves 
suppliers’ credible threats to actively expose each other’s oppressive techniques, thereby 
informing uninformed consumers.67 After all, if suppliers have already exhausted price 
and quality competition, and a supplier wishes to raise its market share at the expense of 
other suppliers, he may wish to find hidden flaws in his rival’s contracts and make them 
salient to consumers. As we shall see below, however, this particular form of competition 
does not always exist. 
A. How Can Competition over Contracts Close the Information Gap? 
 
Suppose the market in which a supplier operates is competitive. How can 
competition the supplier faces help inform consumers about the supplier’s oppressive 
techniques, thereby deterring the supplier from employing inefficient and unfair terms in 
his contract? In this section we answer this question. In sum, it all depends on whether 
competitive tension among rivals in the market triggers not only competition over price 
or quality, but also competition over contracts; only then, suppliers would be effectively 
deterred from using inefficient and unfair techniques in their standard form contracts.  
In the meantime, we purposely ignore special factors, explored in detail in section B 
below, which could stand in the way of competition closing the information gap. In the 
current section we show that even before considering these special factors the effects of 
competition on the information gap crucially depend on the type of oppressive technique 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note, 41 at 240, 247-51 (showing when competitors could collude, even 
tacitly, and what market conditions foster such behavior); See also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, 
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990) 235-75 (same). 
65 See supra note 9. Ezra Friedman, Competition and Unconscionability ((May  2009) (unpublished 
paper presented at Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n, on file with authors) claims that a more competitive market may 
be more prone to exploitation, because firms then earn less money on informed consumers than in a non-
competitive market. He takes the naiveness of consumers as given, however. In our framework, in a 
competitive market, suppliers may want to steal market share by educating consumers. 
66 See supra note 20.  
67 Absent such competition, standard-form contracts could be regulated to make their terms more salient. 
Cf. Mann, supra note 57, at 927-32 (proposing to foster competition among credit card issuers, by 
standardization of most of the terms offered to consumers).  
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used by the supplier. Let us examine these effects separately for each of the four 
oppressive techniques. 
1. Traditional Oppressive Terms 
 
Consider a supplier (“Supplier X”) employing the TOT described in Example 1: His 
standard form contract contains a provision, in the fine print, according to which "the 
supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to 90 days." But now suppose that 
the supplier is not the only one in his market, but rather faces intense competition from 
several rival suppliers who sell TV sets too. Intense competition means that if a supplier 
is offering consumers either a relatively high price or a relatively poor deal, competing 
suppliers can and will offer better deals and/or lower prices.68 But if consumers remain in 
the dark as to Supplier X's TOT hidden in the fine print, simply offering them a deal 
without such a TOT would not suffice in order to persuade them to switch to a competing 
supplier. Hence competing suppliers would often want to let consumers know about 
Supplier X’s hidden TOT, in order to entice them away from Supplier X.69 This is a 
simple case where competition could close the information gap between Supplier X and 
his consumers.  
At times, consumers might learn of a supplier’s inefficient or unfair TOT from 
sources other than the supplier’s rivals. In particular, consumer-oriented web sites could 
provide some information regarding oppressive terms in consumer contracts in certain 
industries.70 In appropriate cases, where an industry is under close scrutiny of reliable 
watchdogs that are committed to protect consumers, a supplier could claim that the threat 
                                                 
68 By "intense competition" we do not necessarily mean competition that drives prices all the way down 
to marginal cost (the cost of supplying the marginal unit). We acknowledge that in real life, in most 
markets competition is not that perfect. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY 
R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 387-400 (1995); TIROLE, supra note 41, at 209-236. Subject to this 
caveat, we assume that competition is intense enough to induce suppliers to try and fight each other for 
market share. In other words, we assume that competitive tension is too intense to sustain tacit or express 
collusion among suppliers. 
69 For examples of such behavior, see infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text. 
70 For example, ConsumerReports.org reported a survey of contracts regarding extended warranties for 
cars, and recommended that consumers pay attention to “exclusions and limitations” in the fine print, 
stressing that in order to learn about them, “you need to delve into the contract.” See 
http://www.consumerreports.org:80/cro/cars/new-cars/buying-advice/extended-warranties-4-08/how-they-
work/how-they-work-continued/extended-warranties-how-they-work-terms-and-coverage.htm. See also 
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of 'Opportunity to Read' in Contract, 4 EUR. REV. OF CONT. L. 428 (2008) 
(Proposing non-legal approaches to making the contract terms more transparent, by building on market 
devices such as ratings and labeling). In addition, independent bloggers or industry analysts occasionally 
highlight the existence of harsh terms in the fine print of particular suppliers. For example, Telecom 
Analyst Bruce Kushnick has revealed allegedly oppressive terms in the fine print regarding the use of 
iPhones. See What’s Hidden in iphone’s Fine Print?, July 9, 2007, 
http://directorblue.blogspot.com/2007/07/whats-hidden-in-iphones-fine-print.html; See also 
http://www.newnetworks.com/attwirelessfineprint.htm; Also, blogger Ken Fisher has alleged that a term in 
AT&T’s contract for Internet connection is oppressive. See infra note 92. 
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of such exposure would suffice in order to deter him from including inefficient or unfair 
TOTs in his contracts, much like competition over contracts would. 
There are various examples of firms criticizing terms hidden in the fine print of their 
rivals’ contracts: To give only a few, in its commercials Capital One, a rewards credit 
card firm, mocks competing reward credit card companies, for hiding various limitations 
to receiving rewards in their fine print, such as minimum card use requirements, 
expiration and inalienability provisions, as well as blackout dates during which rewards 
cannot be used.71 Nationwide, a provider of loans, mortgages and credit cards, has 
emphasized that its rivals’ fine print contains "hidden features" such as the paying off of 
the cheapest debt first and stressed in an Internet publication, that "We think that is 
unfair, so we allow customers to pay off the most expensive debt first."72 In a TV 
commercial, Nationwide highlights how its rivals in the mortgage market hide an "HLC," 
or "Higher Lending Charge" in their contract that kicks in when the amount borrowed 
exceeds a given percentage of the value of the property.73 Broadband Internet Service 
Provider PlusNet criticized its competitors, and specifically its rival Tiscali, for 
misleading customers into believing they had “unlimited connectivity,” whereas the fine 
print of their standard form contracts includes a "fair usage" clause that is designed to 
ease congestion at peak traffic times but effectively serves as a cap on connectivity.74 
Cheap TV Spots, a company which offers TV advertising for small businesses, attacked 
the oppressive fine print of its rivals that sell automated ads.75 Wireless carrier Alltel 
broadcast a TV commercial criticizing rivals AT&T, T-Mobile, Sprint and Verizon (the 
companies’ representatives each wear a T-shirt with the name of the competing carrier 
marked on it) for their fine print preventing customers from changing their wireless plan 
without extending their contract.76 Virgin Mobile too has extensively published critiques 
                                                 
71See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFn4cxy05HA (Capital One commercial in which reward 
limitations are allegorized through a princess kissing a frog and receiving a rat instead, who quotes the fine 
print); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kxpx4HnPcTs (Capital One commercial where limitations are 
allegorized through a tooth fairy quoting the fine print explaining why a child receives merely a nickel for 
her tooth); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WAGJkRh8rXA (Capital One commercial implicitly 
comparing rival’s fine print to living Hell while Capital One causes Hell to freeze out with the slogan 
“Capital One: takes all of the surprises out of reward mile redemption … no hidden fees, no expiration, no 
blackouts.” 
72 See Nina Montagu-Smith, supra note 62.  
73 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Lgbs6A2glk&feature=related (Nationwide commercial 
featuring a couple, frustrated by the provision while the rival bank’s representative tries to distract them); 
For a definition of an HLC, see http://www.home.co.uk/guides/mortgage_glossary.htm?hlc; See also 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFZV3y-p_NY (another Nationwide commercial criticizing rivals for 
first offering low introductory rates so as to “hoike people in” and then exploit them with larger hidden 
fees.) 
74 See David Meyer, PlusNet Accuses Broadband Rivals of Misleading Customers, ZDNET.CO.UK, Sept. 
1 2006, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/0,1000000085,39282114,00.htm.  
75 See http://cheaptvcommercial.com/ (Cheap TV Spots Internet ad calling consumers who choose rivals 
“suckers” due to rivals’ oppressive fine print). 
76 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E1h0KaaOkFM. Following Alltel’s campaign, Verizon 
Wireless and Sprint Nextel announced that they too would alter their contracts to enable customers to 
switch plans without extending the contract’s period. See Matt Kapko, VZW Sues Alltel over Ad Claims; 
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about its rivals’ fine print, including “hidden fees,”77 charging for services the customer 
does not need,78 as well as lock-in periods.79 
2. Selectively Oppressive Terms 
 
Consider now the SOT of Example 3 above, where Supplier X’s standard form 
contract provides that "the supplier bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to 90 
days, unless the consumer asks otherwise at the time of purchase and fills out the 
requisite forms." Suppose now that Supplier X faces intense competition from other TV 
suppliers. To what extent would other suppliers, who vigorously compete with Supplier 
X, have the incentive to inform consumers about Supplier X’s SOT? Unlike the case of a 
TOT, with a SOT, Supplier X’s informed consumers, who have no particular problem 
carefully reading the fine print and filling out the forms, are not subject to the oppressive 
term. Where the transaction costs required from informed consumers to escape the 
oppressive term are negligible, competing suppliers could not entice such informed 
consumers away from Supplier X by highlighting the existence of the SOT. A competing 
supplier could allegedly only steal Supplier X’s potential uninformed consumers – those 
who are subject to the oppressive term. But when a competing supplier reveals the 
existence of the SOT to them, even they may well buy Supplier X’s product, now that 
they know from the competing supplier how to easily relieve themselves from Supplier 
X’s oppressive term. Hence competing suppliers might be unsure how many consumers 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fight Centers on Ability to Change Plans without Impacting Contracts, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Jan. 7, 
2008, at 4. See also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgnSgW-xz3c (where another Alltel commercial 
highlights how customers of its four rivals (represented again by these four representatives) are “stuck” 
with contracts that do not match their individual needs). 
77 See Maryanna Lewyckyj, Cellphone Fee Furor; System Access Charges Subject of Lawsuit, THE 
TORONTO SUN, March 5, 2005, at 48. (Founder of Virgin Mobile quoted saying that his rival cellular 
carriers have been hiding fees in their fine print.); See also 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWMsZLk0mfc (a news bulletin describing the PR strategy behind the 
launching of Virgin Mobile, featuring “Nothing to Hide,” “no contracts” and “no hidden fees.”.); Also, Bell 
Mobility, a Canadian rival of Rogers, the network associated with iPhones, has broadcast a commercial 
criticizing the fees hidden in rivals’ contracts. The ad features customers of rival cell phone companies as 
victims of a crime. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lS4QMYZhcI8. Indeed, the Canadian network 
associated with iPhone has been reported as using oppressive and unfair techniques in its fine print, and 
Bell Mobility was named by reporters as the carrier most likely to feed off the exposure of Rogers' 
behavior. See Gillian Shaw, supra note 62. 
78 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4aNgTXjf5c. (A Virgin Mobile commercial entitled “Don’t 
Get Hosed”).  
79 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZW8VlnGgQQ. (A Virgin Mobile ad entitled “don’t get 
sucked in”); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfjczPVyddI. (Ad with the slogan “Had enough? Get 
Virgin Mobile. No ripoffs, no lock-ins."); http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0jMAu45vas. (Virgin 
Mobile commercial criticizing “the mobile phone companies that tempt you with the so called ‘free 
phones,’ they don’t explain all the costs … “.). Several additional examples of firms criticizing their rivals’ 
fine print exist on file with authors. 
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they could really steal from Supplier X by closing the consumers' information gap, and 
this lack of certainty could stifle their incentive to do so.80 
Accordingly competition has a weak deterrent effect on Supplier X's incentive to 
include an inefficient or unfair SOT in his contract.81 
3. Selectively Beneficial Terms   
 
Will suppliers want to make their rivals’ SBTs salient to consumers? Suppose 
Supplier X adopts the SBT mentioned in Example 4: His fine print provides a special 
discount for consumers who fill out a certain form and mail it back to the supplier. Will 
competing suppliers, engaged in vigorous competition with Supplier X, have an incentive 
to highlight to consumers the existence of Supplier X’s SBT? The analysis here is similar 
to that of SOTs: First, the competing supplier would not necessarily succeed in enticing 
Supplier X’s informed consumers away, since they already enjoy the special discount 
from Supplier X. Second, the rival supplier might not even be able to entice uninformed 
consumers away from Supplier X, since the latter, following the rival’s advertisement 
about Supplier X’s SBT, might simply choose Supplier X’s product and fill out the 
requisite forms.82 As in the case of SOTs, then, there are no substantial benefits from 
exposing a rival’s SBT.83  
                                                 
80 The situation could be different when the transaction costs required in order to neutralize the 
oppressive term are non-negligible. If, for example, filling out the forms in Example 3 is time consuming, a 
competing supplier could steal more of Supplier X’s consumers by highlighting that when buying his TVs, 
no oppressive terms exist, with no need for time consuming filling-out of forms.  
81 See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 9 (showing that competition cannot deter suppliers from using 
avoidable add-ons, that were shown above to resemble SOTs). To be sure, at times competing suppliers 
could derive certain long-term benefits from closing consumers' information gaps as to Supplier X's SOT. 
First, if for some reason the rival supplier is not able to discriminate in favor of informed consumers (as the 
SOT enables Supplier X to do) the rival may want to expose the SOT in order to erode Supplier X’s ability 
to discriminate. Second, emphasizing the existence of Supplier X’s SOT to consumers could erode Supplier 
X’s profits, leaving him fewer funds to invest in improving his product. Still, these subtle long-run 
competitive motivations could not be counted upon to guarantee the rival’s incentives to expose the SOT. 
Criticizing SOTs might become more likely where the SOT binds the consumer to his supplier and makes it 
hard for her to switch to a competing supplier. For example, UK telecom company British Telecom has 
criticized its rival, TalkTalk, alleging that its "customer agreements are unfair because they include a 
'negative opt-out term' which allows TalkTalk to move customers [to its own network] without their 
permission." A British Telecom executive was quoted as saying that "[t]hese clauses are unfair on 
customers and are a shady practice. I am surprised they would ever be considered by a major industry 
operator." The criticized term is a SOT, since, according to TalkTalk’s contract, a consumer can ask, in 
writing, to disqualify TalkTalk from unilaterally moving his telephone line to TalkTalk’s network. See 
Damian Reece, BT Accuses Talktalk of Shady Sales Practice, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 26, 2005, at 49. 
Finally, when third impartial parties, such as consumer-oriented web sites, closely scrutinize the supplier’s 
market, such parties could also deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair SOTs. See supra note 70 and 
accompanying text.  
82 As with SOTs, a rival supplier could try to attract consumers by showing them they can receive the 
same special discount with a smaller hassle. He could lure informed consumers from Supplier X if the 
transaction costs consumers need to bear for receiving the discount from Supplier X are significant.  
83 Edlin, supra note 49, at 538 shows how entry into the market does not alleviate the price-increasing 
effect of price matching policies. Price matching (promising to match a rival’s lower price) bears some 
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4. Complexity 
 
Suppose now that Supplier X is the provider of multichannel TV and Internet 
mentioned in Example 5, who offers complex contracts, the value of which is hard for 
consumers to assess. Can a rival of Supplier X gain from closing the consumers’ 
information gap caused by this complexity? The answer depends on what Supplier X is 
trying to accomplish by using complexity. Naturally, if complexity is used to disguise a 
TOT, rival suppliers may want to help consumers see through the complexity and realize 
the existence of Supplier X’s TOT. As in the case of highlighting the existence of any 
TOT, the rival supplier could, in this way, steal consumers from Supplier X. 
Suppose now, on the other hand, that Supplier X’s complexity is not used to hide a 
TOT but rather to facilitate discrimination by Supplier X, or to facilitate the application 
of SOTs or SBTs. Here rival suppliers’ incentives to neutralize the complexity and 
emphasize this fact could be weaker. Supplier X’s informed and sophisticated consumers 
may well be satisfied with Supplier X, since they know their way through Supplier X’s 
contractual maze. Furthermore, they may be subsidized by Supplier X’s uninformed and 
less sophisticated consumers, who end up with worse deals.84 
B. Factors Preventing Competition from Closing the Information Gap 
 
As we saw in the previous section, competition has the potential of closing the 
information gap between suppliers and consumers mainly when suppliers use TOTs. 
With the other oppressive techniques competition over contracts is expected to be minor 
or non-existent. In this section we discuss several factors that may prevent competition 
from closing the information gap even with respect to TOTs. Each of these factors could 
cause suppliers not to inform consumers about the TOTs used by their rivals. 
1. Backfiring Competition 
 
One reason suppliers might avoid criticizing their rivals' oppressive techniques is that 
by doing so they would expose themselves to consumers' negative reactions toward their 
                                                                                                                                                 
resemblance to SBTs, since it too enables suppliers to discriminate between informed and uninformed 
consumers. As in the case of SOTs, discussed supra note 81, in certain cases there could be long-run, more 
subtle profits derived by a competing supplier from highlighting Supplier X’s SBT. Such subtle 
competitive drives cannot be counted upon, however, to close the information gap. Also, when third 
impartial parties, such as consumer-oriented web sites, closely scrutinize the supplier’s market, such parties 
could deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair SBTs. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
84 To be sure, if a rival supplier offers consumers a simple deal with terms equivalent to those informed 
consumers could receive from Supplier X, they may nevertheless switch to the rival supplier, so as to 
relieve themselves from the transaction costs. Also, in certain circumstances, rivals may have long-run 
incentives to dissipate Supplier X’s ability to discriminate (via complexity) or his ability to make profits in 
this fashion. See supra note 81. Finally, when impartial parties, such as consumer-oriented web sites, 
closely scrutinize the supplier’s market, such parties could simplify complex contracts for the benefit of 
consumers. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
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own products (consumers’ backfiring on product)85 or contracts (consumers’ backfiring 
on contract) or to rivals’ retaliation (rivals’ backfiring). To illustrate, suppose that in 
Example 2 (the Dry Cleaner) the TOT limiting the Dry Cleaner's liability for damage to 
the customer’s clothes was adopted by Dry Cleaner X and is inefficient. Dry Cleaner X’s 
competitors are therefore supposedly expected to expose the TOT and make consumers 
understand its drawback: a high risk of exposure to non-recoverable losses. But despite 
the existence of intense competition in Dry Cleaner X’s market, competing dry cleaners 
may avoid exposing the TOT and its adverse effect on consumers, because this exposition 
may backfire on them. Consumers’ backfiring on the product occurs because by 
illuminating Dry Cleaner X’s TOT a rival supplier may create the impression in 
consumers' minds that dry cleaning as such may result in harm to consumers’ clothes. 
Absent such exposition by rival dry cleaners, the possibility of damage to their clothes (as 
the existence of the TOT itself) may not have been salient to consumers.86 Once 
consumers become aware of the possible harm, their consumption of dry cleaning 
services, including the services of the criticizing dry cleaner, may go down.  
The second type of backfiring, consumers’ backfiring on the contract, can occur 
because when a rival dry cleaner exposes Dry Cleaner X’s TOT this sharpens the 
consumers' attention and increases their aversion toward exclusionary clauses used by dry 
cleaners in general, including the criticizing dry cleaner’s exclusionary clauses. That is, if 
a dry cleaner criticizes Dry Cleaner X’s exclusionary clause, he too would probably have 
to stop using exclusionary clauses, since due to his campaign against Dry Cleaner X’s 
oppressive clauses, consumers would become more sensitive to such clauses.87  
The third type of backfiring, rivals’ backfiring, takes place because when Supplier 
X’s TOT is criticized by a competing supplier, Supplier X is usually expected to retaliate. 
By definition, criticizing a rival’s contract involves “negative advertising.” That is, rather 
than praising his own product, a supplier has something bad to say or imply about his 
rival’s contracts with consumers. Such negative advertising could be costly to the 
criticizing supplier, because it usually invites retaliation by the criticized supplier.88 
                                                 
85 See supra note 13. 
86 See Korobkin, supra note 22, at 1229-1230 (“For a product’s attribute to be salient to buyers, the 
attribute must capture the limited attention of those buyers.”).  
87 Consumers’ backfiring on the product and on the contract are stronger the longer suppliers expect to 
operate in the market. When such backfiring occurs, its damage is usually long lived. If a rival supplier has 
a TOT similar to Supplier X’s TOT and this supplier criticizes Supplier X’s TOT, the criticizing supplier 
would probably need to stop using such a TOT for an indefinite period. Similarly, if such criticism reduces 
the demand for the product, the reduction in demand could last for a considerable period. 
88 See Ming-Jer Chen & Danny Miller, Competitive Attack, Retaliation and Performance: An 
Expectancy-Valence Framework, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 85, 86 (1994) ("If a firm's actions represent a 
threat that is obvious, easy to match, and significant, its alert rivals will be motivated to counter that attack, 
and thus perhaps, to negate its potential benefits"). Retaliation could be a rational strategy if the criticized 
supplier wishes to show consumers that he is not worse than the criticizing supplier and/or when the 
criticized supplier wishes to win back market share enticed away from him by the criticizing supplier. Chen 
and Miller, id. at 88, claim that "[a]n action is more likely to evoke a response if it is easy to imitate, that is, 
if it can be countered simply, economically and without much organizational disruption… .".  
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Retaliation against the criticizing supplier is expected to be harsher the more severe the 
critique.89 
While the threat of consumer backfiring on the product varies from case to case, and 
is at times compelling, suppliers’ fear of rivals’ backfiring always exists to a certain 
extent. Furthermore, consumer backfiring on the contract exists whenever the criticizing 
supplier himself employs oppressive techniques similar to the criticized one. In a market 
in which competition over price and quality is strong, however, consumer backfiring on 
the contract and rivals’ backfiring are not expected, in and of themselves, to stop 
suppliers from criticizing their rivals’ TOTs. In general, any competitive move by a 
supplier involves the need to become competitive himself (as in the case of consumer 
backfiring on the contract) and involves, to a certain extent, retaliation by the suppliers’ 
rivals, who wish to compete back (as in the case of rivals’ backfiring). Nevertheless, in a 
competitive market, these two forms of backfiring are usually presumed not to block 
competition. 
2. Attracting Unwanted Consumers 
 
A supplier would hesitate to expose his rival’s oppressive terms if he expected many 
of the consumers attracted by this exposition to be unwanted consumers.90 Unwanted 
consumers are characterized by the fact that they are so costly to serve that, if possible, a 
supplier would prefer not to serve them at all.  
Unwanted consumers could typically exist in markets for services, long-term 
contracts, sales of products with supplier warranties, and so forth, where consumers of 
certain types are prohibitively costly to serve.91 To illustrate, consider the example given 
in the introduction of a manufacturer of computers who employs a clause in his contracts 
exonerating himself from liability for losses caused by some of the computer’s 
components. Assume now that these components malfunction half of the time due to the 
consumer’s carelessness. A rival computer supplier criticizing this TOT must take into 
account that the first consumers the exposition of the TOT attracts are the careless 
consumers whose expected losses are relatively high. For such consumers the TOT is 
especially harmful. Naturally, the criticizing supplier could not employ a similar 
                                                 
89 Chen & Miller, id., examined the aviation industry in the United States and concluded that the more 
visible, more central and more easily imitated attacks by criticizing firms provoke more responses from the 
criticized. 
90 See supra note 14. 
91 Suppliers often try to get rid of high cost consumers. See, e.g., Alisa Bralove, Screening Clients Can 
Prevent Attorneys from Taking on Problem Clients, THE DAILY RECORD, Aug. 15, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/is_20030815/ai_n10057488/pg_1 (quoting attorneys who 
advise their colleagues on how to identify and get rid of unwanted clients); Lucy Barrett, How Admen Can 
Spot the 'Timewaster.com', MARKETING WEEK, Nov. 4, 1999, 
http://www.mad.co.uk/Main/News/Disciplines/Digital/Articles/7f1953a8adc1428e8de91dcf36c7a7dd/How
-admen-can-spot-the-'timewastercom'.html (reporting how London's top advertising agencies turn down 
new Internet ventures due to their high insolvancy rate).  
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exclusionary clause in his contract. Hence he may rightly fear that many of the 
consumers he would entice away would be "high risk," and therefore "high cost," 
consumers. This would weaken his incentives to expose his rival’s TOT in the first place.  
A similar effect could deter competitors from criticizing the Dry Cleaner's TOT in 
Example 2. The first consumers to leave the Dry Cleaner after they become aware of the 
TOT are those whose clothes are more vulnerable to damage or more expensive. A rival 
dry cleaner who does not limit his liability might hesitate to entice away such consumers, 
whose expected harm from dry-cleaning is on average relatively high.92 
3. Benefit Externalization  
 
As the preceding sections show, the criticizing supplier at times bears costs when he 
exposes a rival’s oppressive technique, particularly due to backfiring of the three above-
mentioned types, and the attraction of unwanted consumers. At the same time, the 
benefits of exposing a rival’s TOT could be shared by many of the other suppliers in the 
market, particularly those who do not use similar TOTs themselves. Consumers 
concerned with their supplier’s exposed TOT might well leave their supplier in favor of 
another supplier who does not use such a TOT, and might not necessarily transfer to the 
criticizing supplier. If the criticizing supplier bears all costs when criticizing his rival and 
does not receive all of the benefits, his incentive to do so will be diminished.93 Moreover, 
each of the suppliers who do not use TOTs may prefer to wait until another supplier 
among them decides to bear the costs of criticizing their rival.94 Consequently, it may be 
that none of them ends up engaging in such criticism.  
4. Irresponsive Consumers 
 
In order for competitive pressure to close the information gap between consumers 
and a supplier, a large enough portion of consumers needs to be responsive to the 
information the rival supplier is trying to convey to them.95 To be sure, not all consumers 
                                                 
92 For another example, consider Internet access provider AT&T’s TOT, enabling it, at the time, to 
“immediately terminate … your Service, any Member ID, electronic mail address, IP address, Universal 
Resource Locator or domain name used by you, without notice, for conduct that AT&T believes… tends to 
damage the name or reputation of AT&T, or its parents, affiliates and subsidiaries.” Naturally, no rival of 
AT&T would wish to highlight the existence of this TOT, because the customers who care about such a 
term and who would likely transfer to the criticizing rival would be those most inclined to harm the 
reputation of their Internet provider. Fortunately, in this case the TOT has been revealed by a journalist. See 
Ken Fisher, AT&T Vows to Use Terms of Service for Good, Not Censorship, Oct. 2, 2007, 
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071002-att-vows-to-use-terms-of-service-for-good-not-
censorship.html. 
93 See supra note 15.   
94 To be sure, some of the costs created when a TOT is exposed are suffered by all rivals, and not only 
by the criticizing supplier. Such are the costs involved in consumers’ backfiring on the product and on the 
contract, and in attracting unwanted consumers. A disproportionate part of these costs, however, are born 
by the criticizing supplier. The costs of rivals’ backfiring are born exclusively by the criticizing supplier. 
95 See supra note 16. 
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need to respond to such information. It is sufficient that a critical mass of them might 
leave the supplier following the rival's advertisements in order to effectively deter the 
supplier from employing the TOT. Such a critical mass of responsive consumers may not 
exist, however. In certain cases, consumers are not only ignorant of the TOT hidden in 
their contract, but also indifferent to advertising by rival suppliers who try to emphasize 
its existence. After all, uninformed consumers are often those who are not willing to 
expend the transaction costs needed in order to read the fine print in their contracts. They 
may be equally unwilling to absorb and verify a rival supplier’s claim that their contract 
is oppressive. Take the TOT of Example 1, for instance, in which Supplier X relieves 
himself from liability for late delivery of a TV set. If a rival supplier advertises, in written 
leaflets put in mailboxes or via Email, that Supplier X’s contract includes a TOT in the 
fine print, consumers who do not read the fine print may also fail to read and absorb such 
an advertisement. In order to induce them to respond, the rival supplier would have to 
expend more resources in advertising. For example, he would have to emphasize Supplier 
X’s TOT in television or radio commercials. But the latter form of advertisement is more 
costly, and therefore could be less profitable for the criticizing supplier. The criticizing 
supplier may well prefer to use the scarce and expensive advertising time he had 
purchased to convey information consumers are more likely to respond to. 
The situation might be different when suppliers use sales representatives who have 
direct contact with consumers. Such sales representatives could try to convince 
consumers to buy their company's product or service by exposing rival suppliers' TOTs 
and emphasizing how the rivals' contract is unfair or draconian. Consumers' responses to 
such efforts might at times be stronger, making the efforts worth their while.96 Also, 
consumers might be more responsive in cases in which their deal with the supplier is a 
larger one.97 
C. Sufficiency of a Competitive Threat 
 
As noted, for competition over contracts to deter suppliers from using inefficient or 
unfair TOTs, rivals need not actually inform consumers about such TOTs. The threat that 
rivals may do so often suffices in order to provide such deterrence.98 When a supplier 
                                                 
96 See Arvind Rangaswamy, Prbhakant Sinha & Andris Zoltners, An Integrated Model-Based Approach 
for Sales Force Structuring, 9 MARKETING SCI. 279, 281 (1990) (examining the role of sales 
representatives and pointing out that on the one hand, short purchase cycle and a competitive environment 
support a constant presence of sales representatives. On the other hand, customers view the presence of 
sales representatives as an inconvenience). 
97 See infra section III.B.1.c. 
98 It is well known that when a market is competitive enough, the mere threat of competition assures 
competitive prices and good quality. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 41, at 101 (showing that in a competitive 
market, product quality will be optimal from the point of view of the average consumer in equilibrium, 
while a different level of quality would not evolve in equilibrium in the first place). This is why antitrust 
courts and agencies approve or disapprove of a transaction, such as a merger among competitors, on the 
basis of the number of viable competitors in the market. If the number and capacity of such rivals is large 
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considers employing an inefficient or unfair TOT, he balances the gains such a TOT 
might grant him with the expected losses from having rivals later criticize his TOTs. 
Even if, say, only a 20% chance of rivals criticizing his TOT existed, such criticism 
might involve such a large expected loss that it would outweigh the gains the supplier 
expected to make from the TOT. This implies that even in cases where one or more of the 
four factors discussed in the previous section partially hinders competition over 
contracts, the probable threat of such competition could suffice to remove inefficient or 
unfair TOTs. 
It should be stressed that the supplier’s expected losses from rivals’ criticism is 
typically long-lived. When its inefficient or unfair TOT is exposed, many consumers may 
leave him in favor of rival suppliers. Even if the supplier stops using the TOT, consumers 
might not trust him anymore. 
III. HOW SHOULD COURTS HANDLE TRADITIONAL OPPRESSIVE TECHNIQUES?  
 
In this part of the Article we propose to courts how to implement the market-based 
approach and when to intervene in standard form consumer contracts based on our 
conclusions from Parts I and II. 
As demonstrated in Part II, competition over contracts serves as a weak deterrent 
against the use of SOTs, SBTs and artificial complexity. Accordingly, these three 
techniques deserve special scrutiny and courts should be particularly suspicious about 
them. This result is striking, as to date courts have virtually ignored these techniques. Yet 
as Part I shows, they potentially pose significant efficiency and fairness concerns. As we 
show elsewhere,99 a host of legal tools exist to cope with the welfare concerns stemming 
from SBTs. As to SOTs and artificial complexity, it would be worthwhile to explore how 
the unconscionability doctrine could be applied to such practices and what other legal 
tools might be available to mitigate their social harm. 
Unlike in the cases of SOTs, SBTs and artificial complexity, where competition 
cannot be counted upon to prevent their social harm, Part II shows how at times 
competition—or even a threat of competition—could deter suppliers from using 
inefficient or unfair TOTs. Part III provides courts with guidelines for applying the 
proposed market-based approach to TOTs. We start by presenting courts' current 
                                                                                                                                                 
enough, the merger is approved, because the threat of competition is counted upon to produce competitive 
prices and quality. See, e.g., Laura L. Stephens, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and Section 7 of The Clayton 
Act: Closing An Antitrust Loophole, 75 B.U. L. REV. 477, 500 (1995) ("In analyzing mergers, economists 
assume that market concentration and market performance (i.e., price competition) tend to vary 
inversely."); Irving Bank Corporation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 845 F.2d 1035 
(1988) (approving a merger among banks due to the low concentration of the market); Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission's 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Statement Accompanying 
Release of Revised Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41, 552; 41,559 (Sept. 10, 1992), at section 1.51 
(“Mergers resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and 
ordinarily require no further analysis.”).  
99 See Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 1020-30. 
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methodology for assessing TOTs. We then continue to propose how courts might 
dramatically change their existing methodology by incorporating the insights of Part II 
into the analysis of TOTs.100 
A. Courts' Existing Attitude toward TOTs and the Proposed Change 
 
Courts utilize various legal tools to deal with TOTs.101 At times, courts conclude that 
TOTs have not been accepted by consumers in the first place and therefore are not part of 
the contract.102 On other occasions, courts interpret TOTs in favor of consumers, 
applying the rule of interpretation against the draftsman.103 Another way courts tackle 
TOTs is to find them unenforceable under public policy considerations.104 At times, 
courts impose liability for misleading advertising, when a supplier publicly advertises 
only the beneficial, salient parts of his product, hiding the parts that make the supplier’s 
real deal less attractive.105 But the most familiar tool courts employ in dealing with TOTs 
is the doctrine of unconscionability.106 According to this doctrine, courts take into 
account two types of unconscionability: procedural unconscionability and substantive 
                                                 
100 For a different approach advocating various degrees of market regulation see Baird, supra note 14, at 
p. 947 (stating that "in mass markets in which there is little dickering or negotiating, legal rules should 
focus … on ensuring the smooth operation of the market as a whole").  
101 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 456-60 (2002) (discussing various legal tools to handle harsh terms in standard form 
contracts). 
102 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 298-300 (1999) ("[a] judicial technique in 
dealing with standard forms is to refuse to hold a party to a term on the ground that, although the writing 
may plainly have been an offer, the term was not one that an uninitiated reader ought reasonably to have 
understood to be part of the offer."); Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(deciding that the franchisee did not agree to the arbitration clause, and thus it is not a part of the 
agreement); C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 181 (Iowa 1975) (refusing to 
enforce an escape clause in an insurance policy because "This escape clause…, was never read to or by 
plaintiff's personnel, nor was the substance explained by defendant's agent").  
103 See, e.g., United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970) (applying the rule of interpretation 
against the draftsman to a construction contract). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §206 
("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is 
generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing 
otherwise proceeds.").  
104See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) ("Employing 
'general contract law principles,' courts will refuse to enforce arbitration provisions that are 
"unconscionable or contrary to public policy.").  
105 See, e.g., Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 663 (2006) (affirming a summary 
judgment imposing liability, since the defendant advertised its products as "Made in U.S.A.," although 
components were manufactured outside the United States); Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 523 F.3d 934 
(9th Cir. 2008) (ruling in favor of parents, who believed snacks for toddlers called "fruit juice snacks" were 
healthy for their children, although the two most prominent ingredients were corn syrup and sugar). 
106 UCC §2-302(1) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application 
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."); see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 151-177 (2000) (discussing the unconsionability doctrine); 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 102, at 908 (same). 
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unconscionability.107 Procedural unconscionability exists when consumers are 
uninformed or when the supplier enjoys a superior bargaining position.108 In such cases, 
consumers, as some courts have maintained, "do not have a meaningful choice."109 
Substantive unconscionability relates to the harshness of the TOT: the more oppressive it 
is the higher its chances of being struck down.110  
Within procedural unconscionability courts often  focus on whether the individual 
consumer claiming the application of the doctrine was informed. For example, a 
consumer who is not a native speaker of English might be considered uninformed and his 
TOT would be condemned, while English speaking consumers subject to the same TOT 
would be considered informed and their TOTs would remain valid.111 An extreme case of 
substantive unconscionability is reflected in occasions in which a TOT is struck down 
because of its very nature. A common example is an exclusionary clause relating to 
personal injury, which is considered by the UCC as prima facie unconscionable.112 At 
times, even exclusionary clauses concerning non-bodily harm, such as the one in 
                                                 
107 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485 (1967) (discussing both types of unconscionability and the interrelation between them); 
Korobkin, supra note 15, at 1254 ("Courts usually search for 'substantive unconscionability' only when 
there is evidence of a procedural defect in the bargaining process. Without evidence of ‘procedural 
unconscionability', courts generally defer completely to seller-drafter terms."); Robert Hillman, Online 
Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 
854 (2006) (discussing the two forms of unconscionability).  
108 See, e.g., Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(Procedural unconscionability is proven by showing "a lack of knowledge, lack of voluntariness, 
inconspicuous print, the use of complex legalistic language, disparity in sophistication or bargaining power 
of the parties and/or a lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about the contract terms."); 
Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381-82 (Cal. App. 2001) ("Procedural 
unconscionability analysis focuses on 'oppression' or 'surprise.'"); First Financial Ins. Co. v. Purolator 
Secur., Inc., 69 Ill. App. 3d 413, 419 (1979) ("The unconscionability doctrine has been applied most often 
to prevent instances of commercial sharp practices by parties possessing superior bargaining power."). 
109 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Circ. 1965) 
("Unconsionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of 
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."); 
Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 651 (2004) ("The oppression component arises 
from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a 
meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party."). 
110 See, e.g., Kinney v. UnitedHealth Care Services, Inc., 70 Cal. App. 1322, 1330 ("'Substantive 
unconscionability' focuses on the terms of the agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to 
‘shock the conscience.’); Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006) ("In other 
words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural 
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable"); Abramson v. 
Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 651 (2004) ("Substantively unconscionable terms may take 
various forms, but may generally be described as unfairly one-sided.").  
111 See, e.g., Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (holding that a contract was 
unconscionable, since the defendant, because of his poor English, could not understand that he had waived 
the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability.).  
112 UCC §2-719(3) ("Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of 
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable…").  
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Example 2 (The Dry Cleaner), may be considered unconscionable regardless of whether 
consumers are informed or not.113  
In addition to courts conducting case by case adjudication, legislatures in several 
states have enacted laws prohibiting the use of certain types of TOTs. For example, 
several states have banned suppliers from disclaiming implied warranties of fitness and 
merchantability of the product or service.114 In many states, suppliers are subject to duties 
of disclosure with respect to certain terms of the deal, including TOTs, thereby closing 
the gap of information between them and consumers.115 At times suppliers are required 
by legislators to clearly disclose to consumers whether they are providing them with a 
limited or a full warranty, yet once the disclosure requirement is met suppliers are free to 
provide a limited warranty.116  
In sum, the brief description above suggests that courts take account of three main 
considerations when deciding whether to strike down a TOT: to what extent consumers 
are informed; the supplier's bargaining power vis a vis consumers; and the harshness of 
the term in question. Yet it is hard to identify a clear and unified theory guiding courts 
when dealing with TOTs.117  
By contrast, the law and economics literature has shown that the main focus of courts 
should be on procedural, rather than substantive unconscionability, and that even within 
procedural unconscionability, only the information gap between suppliers and consumers 
matters, rather than the supplier’s superior bargaining power.118 In particular, when 
consumers are sufficiently informed, it is safe to assume that the policy concerns 
discussed in Part I above are small, i.e., the TOT efficiently allocates risks, creates 
efficient contracting, and does not entail inefficient non-contracting. Moreover, absent an 
information gap, TOTs should also be presumed to be fair. The law and economics 
literature’s conclusion, therefore, is that a TOT’s efficiency hinges solely on whether 
consumers are sufficiently informed. The problem, however, is that it is hard to know 
whether a large enough number of consumers is sufficiently informed. Moreover, even if 
such an information gap is somehow proven to exist, that by itself, as we demonstrate, 
does not mean that the TOT is inefficient. Accordingly, the focus on whether consumers 
                                                 
113 UCC §2-719(3) ("Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or 
exclusion is unconscionable."). 
114 See Farnsworth, supra note 102, at 318 (providing examples of statutes prohibiting disclaimers of 
implied warranties).  
115 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 70 (describing how legislatures impose duties of disclosure on suppliers, 
and arguing that those endeavors are useless).  
116 See, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
2301-2312 (requiring a supplier who grants a written warranty to designate it as either a "full" or a 
"limited" warranty).  
117 See Mann, supra note 57, at 918-9 (arguing that courts that apply the unconscionability doctrine with 
sufficient vigor "are likely to do a poor job of sorting provisions that make economic sense from those that 
reflect overreaching.").  
118 Supra Section I.A.2. 
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are informed or not, demanded by the law and economics literature, to a large extent 
leads to a dead end. 
We propose a totally different methodology for assessing TOTs that circumvents this 
problem: When applying the unconscionability doctrine, courts should look not directly 
at whether an information gap exists, but rather at whether competition in the supplier’s 
market is expected to close the information gap. The virtue of this new methodology is 
that courts have useful tools to observe the strength of such competition, even when they 
cannot assess whether there is an information gap. 
Moreover, existing literature focusing on the question of whether consumers are 
informed overlooks the fact that even the proven existence of an information gap is 
insufficient to justify intervention, because the mere threat of competition, in a given 
case, could incentivize suppliers to adopt only efficient and fair TOTs even when 
consumers are uninformed. That is, even in markets in which suppliers have not actually 
exposed each other’s TOTs, the mere threat of such competitive actions would deter 
suppliers from employing TOTs that cause inefficiency or unfairness. On the other hand, 
in cases where competition over contracts is not strong enough to close the information 
gap, courts should be suspicious of TOTs and take a closer look at them.  
In the next sections, we provide workable guidelines for courts regarding the 
application of this new methodology.  
B. Guidelines for Intervention under the Market-Based Method 
 
In the case of TOTs, competition has the potential of closing the information gap 
between suppliers and consumers. But the question of whether this potential will be 
realized in a particular case depends on the type of the TOT or the transaction, and most 
importantly, the characteristics of the supplier’s market. Naturally, before exploring the 
degree of competition over contracts (the kind of competition that could close the 
information gap), the court should examine how intense competition over price or quality 
is. If the supplier is a monopolist, for example, the TOT should be assessed according to 
the courts’ existing methodology.119 The same is true if the supplier operates in a market 
with only a few firms, and, in addition, the court finds that the market is susceptible to 
tacit or explicit collusive behavior.120 In such a case too, competition cannot be counted 
upon to close the information gap, since suppliers in such a market lack sufficient 
                                                 
119 See Rozeboom v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241, 242, 242–45 (S.D. 1984) (striking 
down a term because the seller was monopolistic). 
120 In Henningsen v. Bloomsfield Motors, 32 N. J. 358, 391 (1960), for example, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, in striking down Chrysler’s restrictive warranty, emphasized the fact that only three 
manufacturers, including Chrysler, controlled over 90 percent of the passenger car market. Furthermore, the 
TOT in question was actually drafted by the “Automobile Manufacturers Association” and hence could 
have constituted explicit collusion (id. at 390); See also Lewis Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard 
Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1169 (1976) (arguing that suppliers in concentrated markets may tacitly 
collude on terms such as warranty coverage so as to facilitate an anticompetitive price). 
38 CONSCIONABILITY THROUGH A MARKET LENS 
 
incentives to act so as to entice away customers from one another. This preliminary 
examination of the degree of competition in the supplier’s market is similar to the way 
federal courts deal with antitrust cases.121 
Once the court finds that the supplier is not a monopolist in his market and that the 
market is not susceptible to collusive behavior, it should examine whether competition 
over contracts might be blocked in this market due to one or more of the four factors 
discussed in Part II: backfire, unwanted consumers, externalization of benefits and 
irresponsive consumers. In this section we propose a set of observable characteristics 
which courts could look at, and through them determine to what extent the four factors 
prevent suppliers from revealing TOTs in their rivals' contracts.122 As demonstrated, the 
implementation of these insights provides several counterintuitive results. 
If, after taking account of these characteristics, a court finds that competition over 
contracts is able to close the information gap, it should not intervene against the TOT. If, 
on the other hand, the court finds that competition over contracts is unable to close the 
information gap, it should be particularly suspicious of the TOT: We propose that in such 
a case, the burden of proof be transferred to the supplier to show that the TOT is 
nevertheless efficient and fair. If this burden is not met, the court should intervene against 
the TOT under the doctrine of unconscionability. 
In what follows, we first consider observable characteristics related to the TOT or the 
transaction itself that shed light on the expected intensity of competition over contracts. 
These characteristics concern the type of TOT and the type of transaction rather than the 
particular attributes of the parties involved. Then we portray observable characteristics 
related to the market in which the supplier is operating. 
1. The Type of TOT or Transaction 
 
a. Does Exposing the TOT Reveal Information about the Product or Service?  
Recall that consumers’ backfire on the product occurs only when criticizing the 
oppressive technique reveals negative information as to the product or service sold by the 
criticizing supplier. Such backfiring does not occur when the criticism reveals negative 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., United States v. CBS, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 832 (1978) (examining the commercial television 
markets and its submarkets); New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, 926 F. Supp. 321 (1995) (examining the 
implications of a merger in the market for breakfast cereals). See also Scherer & Ross, supra note 64, at 
Ch. 7 (discussing the characteristics that make a market prone to tacit collusion); Tirole, supra note 41, at 
Ch. 6 (same); Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission's 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
supra note 98, at section 2.1 (same); The merger guidelines also demonstrate how the market in which the 
supplier operates needs to be defined. See id. at section 1. 
122 An interesting question is whether competition over contracts could pressure suppliers into giving up 
on efficient TOTs and not only on inefficient ones. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay 
in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983) (arguing that the competitive outcome does not reflect 
consumers' preferences, when they are unable to understand their contracts). Apparently, this could occur 
only if such competition did not perfectly inform consumers. But even if that could happen, it should not 
affect courts' decisions when they assess a TOT actually included in a contract.  
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information only about the criticized supplier. To illustrate, in Example 1, where the TOT 
relieves the supplier from liability for late delivery, exposing the TOT does not involve 
negative information about TVs or their supply in general, but only negative information 
about the supplier who employed this TOT. Furthermore, even when criticism about a 
TOT seems to reveal negative information about the product or service, consumers’ 
backfire on the product is not always triggered. To illustrate, in Example 2 (The Dry 
Cleaner) if the risk of damage to clothes from dry cleaning is already salient to 
consumers anyway, or if a competing dry cleaner uses a different technology than Dry 
Cleaner X in which there is hardly any risk to clothes, the competing dry cleaner would 
hesitate less to expose Dry Cleaner X’s oppressive term. In such cases the information 
implied by the criticism does not affect the demand for the criticizing supplier’s product 
or service. On the other hand, if harm to clothes is a possibility at any dry cleaner’s 
facility, and consumers are not aware of this possibility, a rival dry cleaner may hesitate 
to criticize Dry Cleaner X’s TOT.  
 
b. Effects of Exposing the TOT on High-cost Consumers 
As we have explained, sometimes it is possible to predict which consumers would be 
the first to leave their supplier if they were to be informed of his TOT. In Example 2 (The 
Dry Cleaner) the first to leave are consumers whose clothes are expensive. These are 
typically high cost consumers. Rival dry cleaners might find these consumers unattractive 
and accordingly might avoid criticizing the TOT in the first place. This is typically the 
case with many exclusionary clauses, which cap the supplier’s liability for harm. The first 
consumers to leave the supplier when they become informed of the TOT are those who 
pose the greatest risk of harm. 
Another typical example of a TOT the exposing of which could attract high-cost 
consumers is a TOT dealing with litigation over complications in the contract, such as 
arbitration, jurisdiction and so forth.123 The first consumers to react to the exposition of 
such a TOT in their contract are consumers who believe they will be more likely to be 
involved in litigation with the supplier. These are typically high cost consumers. A 
similar problem could exist with TOTs that improve the supplier’s ability to enforce the 
consumer’s contractual obligations.124 When a rival exposes such a TOT, the first 
consumers who would react and switch to the criticizing supplier are consumers who 
believe they might not fulfill all of their contractual obligations. Obviously, these are 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Am. Express 
Mierchants' Litig.), 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 1646, 33-34 (2d Cir. N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009) (holding that a class 
action waiver provision is "incompatible with the federal substantive law of arbitration."); Matterhorn, Inc. 
v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866 (7th Cir., 1985) (denying a seller's motion to compel arbitration because the 
buyer did not clearly intend to be bound by arbitration).  
124 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 106, at 163-167 ("Seller may also include a waiver of defense 
clause, and if the sale is on secured credit, may include a clause that gives the seller a right to repossess if it 
'deems itself insecure.'")  
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unwanted consumers. These insights could justify courts’ relatively strict treatment of 
TOTs dealing with exclusionary clauses, litigation or arbitration, or with suppliers’ tools 
to enforce consumers’ obligations,125 but for reasons different than those currently given 
by courts. Courts’ justifications for intervention in such cases hinge mainly on 
“substantive unconscionability” i.e., the TOTs in question seem particularly one-sided, 
draconian or harsh.126 We claim that the justification for intervention here is not the 
harshness of the TOTs, but rather the fact that such TOTs are unlikely to be competed 
away, due to rivals’ fear of attracting unwanted consumers.127 
 
c. Scope of Transactions 
When the transaction size is large, consumers are expected to be more responsive to 
criticism of TOTs. For example, if instead of the TV sets in Example 1, Supplier X’s 
TOT referred to the sale of a car, even consumers who had failed to read Supplier X’s 
fine print might be alert to rivals’ ads exposing Supplier X’s TOT. Here rivals’ incentives 
to engage in such criticism would be enhanced, because consumers would be more 
responsive to their efforts.128 
 
d. Does the TOT Qualify a Default Rule or a Contractual Benefit? 
Our proposed market-based approach explains why a TOT qualifying a default rule 
(such as an implied warranty) should be treated more strictly than a TOT qualifying a 
benefit granted by the supplier himself (such as an express warranty). This can be 
demonstrated through a variation of example 2 (the dry cleaner). Suppose that the dry 
cleaner offers consumers, in the salient part of his contract, an express warranty covering 
“any damage to cloths”. The TOT in question, in the fine print, qualifies the express 
warranty and says that “cloths will be covered for damage not exceeding $50”. At first 
blush, it seems that such a TOT should be treated strictly, since consumers who only read 
                                                 
125 Supra note 104.  
126 See, e.g. Haprer v. Ultimo, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1410 (2003) ("if an arbitration clause does not 
achieve 'minimum levels of integrity' it would 'be denied enforcement in any circumstances,' but all the 
more so where it is in a contract of adhesion… That is, adhesion was not essential to a finding of 
unconscionability."); Affholter v. Franklin County Water Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106254 (2008) 
(granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration since the arbitration provision was not substantively 
unconscionable).  
127 Another example, borrowed from Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 29, at 830-1, is a term in a contract 
between a publisher and authors, according to which the publisher is allowed to publish the book, after the 
time scheduled for authors' final approval of proofs, even if the authors have failed to meet the deadline for 
approval. This example demonstrates Bebchuk & Posner's argument that one-sided terms in consumer 
contracts allow selective enforcement by suppliers, which could be efficient. Id. We suggest that if the term 
is inefficient, competition over contracts among publishers is unlikely to touch upon such a term, since 
rival publishers understand that the first authors to leave the publisher using the one-sided term would be 
those who expect to be late in approving their book's proofs.  
128 Cf. Mann, supra note 57, at 900 (explaining consumers' inattentiveness to credit transactions by the 
small size of the transactions).  
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the salient part of the contract are deceived by the TOT. But if the supplier’s market is 
competitive the conclusion could change, in light of the proposed market-based method. 
Since the express warranty is offered in the salient part of the contract, it must mean that 
backfiring on the product and attraction of unwanted customers are relatively weak: Had 
they been strong, the supplier would not have wanted to highlight the existence of the 
express warranty. Emphasizing that damage to cloths is covered informs consumers that 
such damage is possible (possibly causing backfiring on the product) and could attract 
high cost consumers (who particularly appreciate such a warranty). Hence when such an 
express warranty exists, these two factors can be presumed to be insignificant. For the 
same reason, rival suppliers would not be deterred from highlighting the existence of the 
TOT qualifying the express warranty. They too will not fear from backfiring on the 
product and attraction of unwanted consumers. The same is true for consumer 
irresponsiveness: If the supplier makes an effort to make his warranty salient, this must 
mean that such a warranty is important to consumers. Hence consumers are also expected 
to be alert to rivals’ ads stressing that the warranty is actually qualified. Accordingly, 
competition over contracts is relatively strong in this case (subject to benefit 
externalization), and intervention is less justified. 
Suppose now that the TOT qualifies an implied warranty, set in a default rule, rather 
than qualifying an express warranty, granted by the supplier himself. In such a case, 
backfiring on the product, attraction of unwanted consumers and consumer 
irresponsiveness may well be strong, thereby stifling competition over contracts. 
Therefore, such a TOT may deserve closer scrutiny than the TOT qualifying the express 
warranty.129 
2. Characteristics of the Supplier’s Market 
 
a. Number of Suppliers in the Market Not Using the TOT 
Suppose Supplier X is a dry cleaner in a certain area of New York City using a TOT 
like the one in Example 2, capping his liability for damaged clothes. Imagine this TOT is 
attacked in court. The court could often use the number of other suppliers in the market 
(all dry cleaners in the above-mentioned area of New York City) not using a similar TOT 
in order to assess the strength of the benefit externalization factor.130 If rival suppliers not 
using a similar TOT are too numerous, a supplier who exposes Supplier X’s TOT may 
fear that the benefits from such exposition would be shared by all suppliers not using the 
                                                 
129 The analysis could change in particular circumstances. For example, a computer supplier could have 
an express warranty for “any damage or loss” and qualify it with a TOT saying that the warranty “does not 
cover damage due to fire caused by a defect in the computer.” Here the express warranty itself could be too 
general to cause backfiring on the product. Still rivals may hesitate to highlight the existence of the TOT, 
so as not to inform consumers that defects in computers could cause fire. 
130 To this end, the court needs to define the relevant market in which Dry Cleaner X operates, i.e., 
answer the question who are Dry Cleaner X’s rivals? This is a task routinely fulfilled by courts in antitrust 
cases. See supra note 121. 
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TOT: Consumers might leave Supplier X in favor of another supplier not using the TOT, 
and not necessarily in favor of the criticizing supplier. Suppose, for example, that the 
TOT is used only by Dry Cleaner X and is not used by five competing dry cleaners. Here 
benefit externalization is particularly great and the chance that one of Supplier X’s five 
rivals would want to expose X's TOT are slight. 
This further implies that benefit externalization is smaller (and hence competition 
over contracts is stronger) the more suppliers in the market use similar TOTs. This result 
stands in stark contrast to courts’ and scholars’ conventional premise, according to which 
if many or all suppliers in a market use an oppressive term, it has greater chances of 
being stricken down.131 The analysis above shows that the contrary may be true: If most 
suppliers use a similar TOT, and the market is competitive in other respects,132 benefit 
externalization is small, and competition over contracts may well be strong. In such a 
market, had the TOT been inefficient or unfair, any of the suppliers, and especially those 
not using the TOT, may well have had a strong incentive to expose it (subject to the other 
three factors that may hinder such incentives), since the benefits from such an exposition 
would not be externalized. This could support a conclusion that the TOT is actually 
efficient and fair, notwithstanding its harsh appearance. 
Conversely, courts often treat a supplier’s TOT leniently when the consumer is 
shown to have a choice of rival suppliers who do not use a similar TOT.133 But again, the 
                                                 
131 See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971) (quoting United States v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting)) ("The weaker party, in need of the 
goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author 
of the standard contract has a monopoly or because all competitors use the same clauses."); Lloyd v. 
Service Corp. of Ala., 453 So.2d 735, 739 (Ala. 1984) (same); Taylor v. Leedy and Co., 412 So. 2d 763, 
766 (Ala. 1982) (striking down an expultatory clause in a lease because “almost all leases contain these 
exculpatory clauses.”); See also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom 
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (“The weaker party, in need of goods and services, is 
frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms … because all competitors used the same 
clauses.”); ; Julian S. Lim, Comment: Tongue-Tied in the Market: The Relevance of Contract Law to 
Racial-Language Minorities, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 616 (2003) (same); John P. Little, Note: Managed 
Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating The Doctor-Patient Relationship And Endangering Patient 
Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397 (1997) (“While MCOs compete with each other on price and benefits, 
most MCOs employ standard form contracts with remarkably similar terms.”) 
132 If there are only a few suppliers in the market, and it is prone to collusive behavior (supra notes 120-
121 and accompanying text) courts should be mindful of the concern that all or most suppliers in a market 
use a similar TOT because suppliers are tacitly or expressly colluding. This was probably the case in 
Henningsen, 32 N. J. at 391, where the market was extremely concentrated and the TOT had been dictated 
by an association comprised of the suppliers (see supra note 120). 
133 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“ … 
the ‘oppression’ factor of the procedural element of unconscionability may be defeated, if the complaining 
party has a meaningful choice of reasonably available alternative sources of supply from which to obtain 
the desired goods and services free of the terms claimed to be unconscionable.”); Bradberry v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., 2007 WL 1241936 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (where the court implied that had the defendant 
brought evidence “regarding the availability of alternative sources of cellular phone service without the 
allegedly unconscionable terms” it might have prevailed); Pack v. Damon Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 545, 556 
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (finding no procedural unconscionability in an arbitration clause because the “[p]laintiff 
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preceding analysis shows that this sort of reasoning is flawed: the more numerous are the 
supplier’s rivals who do not use the TOT, the less likely is the TOT to be competed away, 
and the more suspicious courts should be toward it. In such cases, rivals will be less 
likely to expose the supplier’s TOT, because they will fear that the benefits from such an 
exposition will be externalized to the other suppliers not using the oppressive term. 
To be sure, if all suppliers in the market use the TOT, or similar TOTs, although 
benefit externalization does not exist, all such suppliers would fear consumer backfiring 
on the contract: They might hesitate to expose rivals’ TOTs so as not to have to stop 
using their own TOTs. Therefore, the ideal market in this respect is one in which almost 
all suppliers use the TOT (or similar practices). In such a case, the few suppliers not 
using the TOT, or similar TOTs, are not exposed to consumer backfiring on the contract 
(since they are not using such TOTs to begin with) and benefit externalization remains 
particularly small (since the number of rivals not using such TOTs is small). 
 
 b. The Existence of Sales Representatives in Contact with Consumers 
The analysis of Part II reveals that when Supplier X’s rivals employ sales 
representatives, who are in direct contact with consumers, these rivals are more likely to 
expose Supplier X’s TOTs. Suppose again that Supplier X is the dry cleaner employing 
the TOT from Example 2. Assume Dry Cleaner X has a rival, Dry Cleaner Y. Dry 
Cleaner Y’s employees, operating Y’s facility, are in direct contact with customers. They 
could use this direct contact to highlight the existence of Dry Cleaner X’s TOT. 
Such direct interaction could help overcome consumer irresponsiveness and could 
mitigate the fear of rivals’ backfiring. It could alleviate consumers’ irresponsiveness 
because consumers present at Y’s facility are more alert to the direct messages conveyed 
to them by Y’s employees and agents. Direct contact also relieves some of Y’s fear of 
retaliation from Supplier X because, unlike criticism made via public advertising, 
Supplier X need not know that Supplier Y’s employees have criticized him in this 
manner. 
Conversely, if Supplier X’s rivals do not have such direct contact with consumers, 
they are less likely to expose Supplier X’s TOT. Suppose, for example, that Supplier X, 
like his rivals, sell electronic products over the Internet.134 Absent direct contact between 
Supplier X’s rivals and consumers, consumer irresponsiveness and the fear of Supplier 
X’s retaliation may, in certain cases, deter X’s rivals from criticizing his contracts.135 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
has not shown that [defendant] was his only source for buying a new motor home, or that other potential 
sources required submitting disputes to arbitration”). 
134 See Hillman, supra note 107, at 840-2 (explaining that on-line consumers tend not to read their 
contracts, because negotiation is impossible).  
135 While the absence of sales representatives does not necessarily imply that consumers are 
irresponsive, it demands that the question of consumers’ responsiveness be further examined. 
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c. Is the Product or Service Essential to Consumers? 
Suppose the product or service sold by the supplier using the TOT is essential to 
consumers, such as a drug that cures a certain illness, but the supplier’s market is 
nevertheless competitive. For example, there are several other suppliers who sell drugs 
that cure the same illness. How should courts treat a TOT exempting a supplier from 
liability for the drug's side effects? Courts treat such TOTs with particular suspicion, and 
often strike them down as unconscionable.136  
In contrast, our analysis reveals that such TOTs are actually less susceptible to 
"backfiring on the product" and in this sense are more exposed to competition over 
contracts. The reason is that when a product or service is essential to consumers they 
would not easily give up purchasing it. As a result, rival suppliers of such products or 
services would not hesitate to criticize a supplier using such a TOT (subject to the other 
factors that could hinder competition over contracts). These rival suppliers know that 
even if their criticism would reveal unpleasant information about the product or service, 
consumers would still buy it. In the above-mentioned drug example, rival suppliers would 
not hesitate to highlight that their rival exempts itself, in the fine print from liability for 
the drug’s side effects. If the drug is essential to consumers, demand for the drug would 
not substantially go down, in spite of consumers becoming aware of its side effects. 
Therefore, under our approach, with essential products or services (sold by a competitive 
industry) courts should actually count more on competition over contracts, and intervene 
less, than with other products and services in which there is a threat of backfiring on the 
product..     
 
d. Alternative Parties Likely to Expose the TOT 
As noted, at times the exposition of a supplier’s inefficient or unfair TOT could 
come from parties other than the supplier’s rivals, such as consumer organizations or 
websites.137 Such parties could play a role similar to that of competition over contracts in 
deterring suppliers from placing inefficient or unfair TOTs in their fine print. Note that 
this deterrent effect is not subject to backfiring, attraction of unwanted consumers or 
benefit externalization. These are factors that restrain only rivals' criticism of the 
supplier's TOT and not criticism by objective parties from outside the supplier's market. 
Accordingly, if the court finds that in the supplier’s market, oppressive terms in 
consumer contracts are subject to close scrutiny by reliable parties, whose interests 
                                                 
136 See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) ("As a result of the 
essential nature of [medical services], in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking 
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who 
seeks his services."); Ransburg D/B/A Twin Lakes Apartments v. Richards, 770 N.E.2d 393 (Ct. App. 
Indiana, 5th Dist., 2002) (striking down an exculpatory clause due to the essential nature of the service); 
Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. 1992) (same). 
137 Supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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coincide with those of consumers, and in addition many consumers are likely to become 
informed by such parties, court intervention is unnecessary. 
The above-mentioned guidelines for courts are summarized in the following table. 
 
TABLE 2: GUIDELINES FOR COURTS 
Prima Facie Case for Intervention No Intervention 
Criticizing TOT provides negative 
information about the product/service 
(consumers’ backfiring on product) 
Criticizing TOT provides negative information 
about the supplier 
(no consumers’ backfiring on product) 
Criticizing TOT attracts high-cost 
consumers 
(unwanted consumers) 
Criticizing TOT attracts low-cost or average 
consumers 
(wanted consumers) 
Small transactions 
(irresponsive consumers) 
Large transactions 
(responsive consumers) 
TOT qualifies a default rule 
(backfiring on the product, attraction of 
unwanted consumers, and consumer 
irresponsiveness could be strong) 
TOT qualifies an express benefit granted by the 
supplier 
(backfiring on the product, attraction of unwanted 
consumers, and consumer irresponsiveness 
usually weak) 
Few suppliers use similar TOTs 
(benefit externalization)  
Almost all suppliers use similar TOTs 
(most benefits internalized and no concern of 
backfire on the contract) 
 
No sales representatives 
(rivals’ backfiring, risk of irresponsive 
consumers) 
Sales representatives exist 
(less rivals’ backfiring, consumers more 
responsive) 
Product is inessential 
(backfiring on the product possible) 
Product is essential  
(no backfiring on the product) 
No alternative parties likely to expose the 
TOT (no alternative to competition over 
contracts) 
Alternative parties likely to expose the TOT (an 
alternative to competition over contracts) 
 
To finalize our guidelines, it should be noted that our market-based approach could 
also be employed ex ante, rather than ex post.138 That is, an agency could decide ex ante 
whether a standard consumer contract was efficient according to our proposed guidelines, 
and once the agency decided affirmatively, the contract would be immune from courts’ 
scrutiny for a certain period of time. There are several advantages to ex ante scrutiny. 
First, it would save litigation costs, since the contract would be litigated only once, while 
with ex post intervention litigation reoccurs whenever consumers sue the supplier. 
Second a specialized agency conducting ex ante scrutiny would likely be more apt and 
skillful than courts in applying the market-based guidelines we propose. Finally, ex ante 
scrutiny would promote certainty: once a contract was approved by the agency, the 
supplier could be confident that none of his contract's clauses would be struck down. 
                                                 
138 Cf. Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be 
Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723 (2008). (arguing for ex ante scrutiny of consumer contracts). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Article presents four oppressive techniques which suppliers often use in their 
standard-form contracts to extract value from uninformed consumers: TOTs, SOTs, SBTs 
and complexity. Only the first technique is closely scrutinized by courts. Ironically, 
courts' attention is much more needed with respect to the other three techniques, which 
are currently ignored by them, since these techniques are expected to survive even fierce 
competition among suppliers. Especially two of these practices – SOTs and complexity – 
could lead to substantial social harm if not closely scrutinized.  
TOTs, on the other hand, are potentially affected by competition. The type of 
competition that affects TOTs is competition over contracts, rather than over price or 
quality. When competition over contracts exists it has the potential to close the 
information gap between suppliers and consumers, thereby securing efficient and fair 
contracts. Furthermore, even a threat of such competition would suffice in order to assure 
the efficiency and fairness of suppliers’ contracts. 
Accordingly, we suggest the application of a market-based approach to TOTs in 
consumer contracts, instead of scrutinizing them on the basis of the discrete transaction 
and its particular characteristics, as courts currently do. According to the market-based 
approach, TOTs should be assessed in light of the intensity of competition over contracts 
in the supplier’s market. The Article reveals the observable characteristics of the 
supplier’s market, and of the type of TOT or transaction, which determine the viability of 
competition over contracts in this market. When competition over contracts is shown to 
be able to close the information gap, intervention against the TOT is unwarranted. When 
competition over contracts cannot be counted upon to inform consumers, the burden 
should be transferred to the supplier to show that her TOT is nevertheless efficient and 
fair, as otherwise the TOT will be struck down. 
This Article thus presents a third phase in courts' attitudes toward consumer 
contracts. In the first phase, consumer contracts were considered by courts as ordinary 
contracts, requiring no special treatment. In the second phase, courts became suspicious 
of consumer contracts and developed several tools for handling them, focusing on the 
particular characteristics of the transaction. In this Article, we suggest that it is time to 
introduce a third phase: Rather than examining each consumer contract in isolation, 
courts need to acknowledge that consumer contracts are a market-phenomenon which 
calls for a market-based approach. 
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